Unstacking the Deck: Administrative Summary Judgment and Political Control by Platt, Alexander I.
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Alexander I. Plattt
The Administrative Procedure Act's provisions on formal adjudication
give individuals charged in administrative enforcement actions the right to an
in-person oral hearing. But not always. Agency prosecutors can circumvent
formal hearing procedures without the consent of the defendant by resolving
cases on "administrative summary judgment. " A 1971 Harvard Law Review
Article endorsed this procedure as a way for agency prosecutors to avoid
'futile" hearings, and courts have upheld it based on the same technocratic
justification. Yet administrative procedure is not merely an instrument to be
expertly calibrated by administrators; it is a mechanism of political control.
When Congress assigns enforcement of a given program to a formal
adjudication regime, it is exercising its authority to "stack the deck, " giving
defendants access to elaborate procedural protections and limiting or
channeling the enforcement program. Administrative summary judgment
"unstacks the deck"-it unwinds Congress's procedural controls and allows an
agency to recalibrate its enforcement priorities.
At the Securities and Exchange Commission, many administrative
proceedings are now resolved on "summary disposition" without any in-person
hearings. The recent expansion of summary dispositions has facilitated a broad
shift in the agency's enforcement priorities toward easy-to-prosecute offenses,
enabling the agency to show Congress a "record number of enforcement
actions" year after year. That figure has (apparently) significant political
value, but does not indicate anything about the effectiveness of the SEC's
enforcement program.
Setting enforcement priorities is a critical .function for agencies like the
SEC that are charged with enforcing a vast and complex array of legal
obligations, but which have resources to pursue only a relatively small number
of possible violations. Securities scholars have long debated the SEC's
enforcement priorities, but have overlooked the role administrative
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adjudication procedure plays in shaping those priorities-as both a vehicle for
congressional control and administrative rebellion.
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Introduction
The APA's provisions on formal adjudication ordinarily guarantee a trial-
like hearing.' The respondent appears in person before an ALJ in a courtroom,
or court-like setting. His lawyer can cross-examine the government's witnesses
and present evidence. And he can take the stand himself to assert his innocence,
or beg forgiveness.
But not always. Agency enforcers can dispense with the full-blown
hearing and obtain a quick and easy victory by persuading an ALJ to resolve a
case on summary judgment. Once rare, these motions are now frequently used
by agencies to skip over administrative hearings without the defendants'
consent. The intellectual foundation for this development comes out of a 1971
Harvard Law Review Article.2 The authors, presenting the results of a study
1. See, e.g., I KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 408 (1958);
see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556; JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD A. MERRILL, & PETER M. SHANE,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 423 (6th ed. 2009).
2. Ernest Gellhorn & William F. Robinson, Summary Judgment in Administrative
Adjudication, 84 HARV. L. REV. 612 (1971).
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sponsored by the Administrative Conference of the United States, argued that
the statutory right to a hearing should not bar summary judgment because the
right does not apply to "futile" hearings. Agencies and courts have embraced
this justification and administrative summary judgment has quietly become a
powerful tool for administrative enforcers.
This broad consensus supporting administrative summary judgment is not
well-founded. Administrative procedure is not only an instrument to be
expertly calibrated to implement the underlying program with maximum
efficiency, it is also an instrument of political control. When Congress
delegates implementation of a program to an administrative agency, it can
design administrative procedures that "stack the deck" in favor of a particular
constituency to ensure that the agency's implementation will remain faithful to
Congress's intentions for the program.3 When Congress requires a full hearing
before an agency can impose certain penalties, this has the effect of limiting
and channeling that agency's enforcement program and priorities. By
dispensing with this hearing requirement, administrative summary judgment
unstacks the deck, removing the enforcement controls imposed by Congress,
and facilitating "drift" away from the enacting Congress's plans for the
enforcement program.
A study of the Securities and Exchange Commission's use of this
technique highlights the shortcomings of the consensus justification for
administrative summary judgment. The SEC's administrative adjudication
regime has been the subject of recent scrutiny,4 but critics have overlooked the
agency's expansive use of motions for "summary disposition." A close study
reveals that for SEC prosecutors this procedure is not merely a tool used to skip
over "futile" hearings as they happen to arise. Rather, the procedure is itself
shaping the agency's enforcement priorities, steering it towards certain types of
cases and defendants. In other words, the ability to dispense with the full
hearings originally required by Congress has led to securities enforcement
"drift."
The federal securities laws impose a vast (and expanding) array of legal
obligations on issuers, exchanges, underwriters, corporate insiders, hedge
funds, brokers, dealers, lawyers, accountants, and many others. The scope and
complexity of these obligations ensures that the volume of potential violations
easily outstrips the resources available to the SEC to pursue them.
Accordingly, the agency is forced to make programmatic choices about which
cases it will pursue, which obligations it will enforce, and which actors it will
3. See infra Section I.B. In this context, "stacking the deck" is not a pejorative.
4. See, e.g., Alexander I. Platt, SEC Administrative Proceedings: Backlash and
Reform, 71 BUS. LAW. 1 (2016); see also infra text accompanying notes 97-106 (reviewing recent
studies of SEC enforcement).
5. E.g., DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS,
wALL STREET, AND THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 46 (2016) ("[T]he SEC has been forced
to live in relative poverty given what is being asked of it.").
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investigate-and which not. These enforcement priorities become a
fundamental component of the regulatory landscape. Investors and the voting
public count on the SEC to choose its enforcement priorities wisely and in the
public interest. The regulated industry (along with the defense bar) pays close
attention whenever the SEC announces a new enforcement initiative or brings a
new type of case.6
Given the significance of these decisions, it is unsurprising that SEC's
enforcement priorities seem to be the source of perpetual controversy. To date,
however, the SEC's critics and defenders alike have overlooked administrative
adjudication procedure as a factor driving the agency's enforcement priorities
and as a mechanism by which Congress asserts control over these priorities.7
The same is true of administrative law scholars more generally. The paper
aims to help correct this oversight.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I reviews the consensus
justification for administrative summary judgment, surveys the inadequacies in
this justification, and provides an alternative theoretical lens-"unstacking the
deck"-which treats administrative summary judgment as an instrument of
political control. Part II elaborates and develops an indirect "test" for these two
competing theories, and Part III applies this test to a case study of the SEC's
summary disposition program. Part IV reviews the implications of this new
lens for scholars, and offers recommendations for how agencies, courts, and
Congress should adjust their approaches to administrative summary judgment.
I. Two Theories of Administrative Summary Judgment
This Part presents two competing modes of analysis of administrative
summary judgment. It begins by exploring the intellectual foundation for the
broad contemporary acceptance of the procedure-what I call the "Consensus
Justification." It then criticizes this justification, and presents an alternative-
"Unstacking the Deck." Finally, it compares the two theories.
A. The Consensus Justification for Administrative Summary Judgment
Until the early 1970s, very few agencies used administrative summary
judgment.9 This began to change after the publication of an article by Ernest
Gellhorn and William Robinson in the Harvard Law Review in 1971. The
Article, presenting the results of a study sponsored by the Administrative
Conference of the United States, urged agencies to "take a leaf from the federal
6. See infra note 33.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 104-106 (surveying recent empirical studies of
SEC enforcement).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 211-223 (surveying recent literature on
administrative enforcement).




rules of civil procedure" and utilize administrative summary judgment "to
reduce delay." They argued that the statutory right to a hearing was no obstacle
because "statutory . . . rights to a hearing should not be interpreted as
prohibiting the use of summary judgment by an agency to eliminate futile
evidentiary hearings."'0 The right to a hearing could be properly dispensed
with, therefore, in those cases where "the absence of a hearing could not affect
the decision," 11 and "when the papers filed with the motion clearly reveal that
an evidentiary hearing would serve no useful purpose."
2
Armed with a justification for dispensing with statutory hearing rights,
agencies embraced administrative summary judgment. And, when challenged,
Courts upheld it based on the same rationale.'3 D.C. Circuit Judge Harold
Leventhal framed the point most colorfully: "[T]he right of opportunity for
hearing does not require a procedure that will be empty sound and show,
signifying nothing."'4 Others invoked similar logic, concluding that holding a
statutory hearing that would not enhance the accuracy of the outcome would be
"strange,"1 a "waste of time,"l6 would defy "common sense,"1 and "serve no
useful purpose,"'8 and so such a design "cannot [be] impute[d] to Congress."'
9
10. Id. at 620.
11. Idat617.
12. Id. at 616.
13. See Costle v. Pac. Legal Found., 445 U.S. 198, 215 (1980) (rejecting the
requirement of a hearing in all cases except where the agency demonstrates a lack of genuine issue of
material fact because this procedural requirement would "raise serious questions about the EPA's ability
to administer the . . . program"); Nat'l Indep. Coal Operators' Assn. v. Kleppe, 423 U.S. 388, 399 (1976)
(upholding regulations which keyed the statutory requirement of a hearing to a request for such a
hearing in part where "[e]ffective enforcement of the Act would be weakened if the Secretary were
required to make findings of fact for every penalty assessment including those cases in which the mine
operator did not request a hearing and thereby indicated no disagreement with the Secretary's proposed
determination"); Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 621 (1973) ("If FDA
were required automatically to hold a hearing for each product .. . even though many hearings would be
an exercise in futility, we have no doubt that it could not fulfill its statutory mandate .... ); Puerto Rico
Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. EPA, 35 F.3d 600, 605-07 (1st Cir. 1994) ("[S]ummary judgment often
makes especially good sense in an administrative forum, for, given the volume of matters coursing
through an agency's hallways, efficiency is perhaps more central to an agency than to a court.").
14. Citizens for Allegan Cty., Inc. v. FPC, 414 F.2d 1125, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
15. Crestview Parke Care Ctr. v. Thompson, 373 F.3d 743, 750 (6th Cir. 2004).
16. United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956).
17. Veg-Mix, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 832 F.2d 601, 607 (D.C. Cit. 1987).
18. Hess & Clark v. FDA, 495 F.2d 975, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
19. Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 623 (1973); see
also Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. EPA, 35 F.3d 600, 606 (1st Cir. 1994) ("Due process
simply does not require an agency to convene an evidentiary hearing when it appears conclusively from
the papers that, on the available evidence, the case only can be decided one way." (emphasis added));
Burnele V. Powell, Administratively Declaring Order: Some Practical Applications of the Administrative
Procedure Act's Declaratory Order Process, 64 N.C. L. REV. 277, 284 (1986) ("No good reason exists
for proceeding with a formal hearing in the absence of any genuine issue of material fact."); id. at 282
(administrative summary judgment "ensures that neither members of the public nor federal agencies are
allowed to gain unfair advantages as a result of meaningless procedural steps" (emphasis added)); R.
Cameron Turner, Note, Streamlining EPA's NPDES Permit Program With Administrative Summary
Judgment: Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v. Environmental Protection Agency, 26 ENVTL.
L.J. 729, 730 (1996) (noting that administrative summary judgment can "effectively resolve disputes
without expending valuable agency resources or infringing on a party's statutory right to a hearing").
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This Consensus Justification for administrative summary judgment
implicitly reflects the logic of Economic Analysis of Civil Procedure. Judge
Posner set the terms in 1973, articulating the goal of procedure as the
minimization of the sum of "error costs" and "direct costs."20 Though "error
costs" is a capacious term, encompassing all social costs imposed by the
adjudication, Posner traced these costs to "judicial error"-i.e., inaccurate
21adjudication. Others have followed this approach, emphasizing the tradeoff
between procedural cost and outcome accuracy.22 Refrained in these terms, the
Consensus Justification for administrative summary judgment embraces that
procedure as a way to avoid costly hearings wherever the benefits (reduced
procedural costs) outweigh the costs (inaccuracy).23
In adopting this technocratic framework to justify administrative summary
judgment, these scholars and courts are in good company. The Supreme Court
has adopted this approach in the context of procedural due process, defining
constitutionally mandated procedures as a function of "the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of [the private] interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards" and
"the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail."24 Much of the legal literature on administrative procedure adopts
a similar mode of analysis.25 And parts of the APA also seem to embody this
view. Section 556(d) provides individuals in formal adjudications with the right
20. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure, 2 J. LEGAL STUD.
399 (1973).
21. Id. at 401 ("[R]eduction of error is a goal of the procedural system" because such
error is a "source of social costs."); see also George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, in
ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 56 (Gary S. Becker & William Landes, eds.
1974) ("There is one decisive reason why the society must forego 'complete' enforcement of the rule:
enforcement is costly.").
22. Daniel Klerman, The Economics of Civil Procedure, 11 ANN. REV. OF L. & SOC.
Sci. 353, 354 (defining "error costs" as efficiency losses caused by "inaccurate adjudication"). For a
more nuanced view, see Louis Kaplow & Stephen Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV.
961, 1186-87 & n.536 (2001) ("Legal procedures that produce more accurate outcomes typically will
lead to more desirable behavior" but "[w]e do not mean to suggest that effects on accuracy are the only
relevant features of procedure besides cost.").
23. Klerman, supra note 22, at 355 ("By terminating cases early, [dispositive motions]
reduce direct costs, such as the cost of discovery and trial. Whether they increase error costs depends on
the standards used. If motions are granted only when the probability that the plaintiff would prevail at
trial is zero or very low, then motions increase error costs by little or nothing.").
24. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see also Jerry Mashaw, The Supreme
Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of
Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1978).
25. See Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75
VA. L. REV. 431, 443 (1989) (stating that the literature on administrative law and organizational design
"deals with achieving efficient outcomes within a process that protects the rights of people who are
likely to be affected by a policy decision"); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in
Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1751 (2007) ("Legal scholars are largely united in a
general obsession with the Supreme Court's role in enhancing the legitimacy of agency action, for




to cross-examine the government's witnesses, but only "such . . . as may be
required for a full and true disclosure of the facts."26 Hearing officers may
allow depositions "when the ends of justice would be served."27 Costly
procedures may be dispensed with where they would not enhance accuracy.28
In addition, courts that have upheld administrative summary judgment
have also drawn on, and expanded Gellhorn and Robinson's analogy to
summary judgment in the civil context. One court explained: "Given that
federal district courts can decide cases as a matter of law without an oral
hearing when it is clear there are no genuine material disputes to be resolved in
a trial, it would be bizarre if administrative agencies, which are in many
respects modeled after the federal courts and which indeed often have more
informal proceedings than federal courts, could not follow a similar rule."
29
Another explained: "[S]ummary judgment is less jarring in the administrative
context; after all, even under optimal conditions, agencies do not afford parties
fill-dress jury trials."
B. Challenging the Consensus Justification
For decades, agencies have developed the practice of administrative
summary judgment, and courts have upheld it, based on the intellectual
foundation laid by Gellhorn and Robinson. But this foundation cannot support
that weight.
First, the Consensus Justification entirely overlooks agencies' most
important enforcement decisions. It is focused on the individual case level,
asking whether a hearing would be futile in a particular case.31 But agencies
also set enforcement priorities; they decide which types of cases and
defendants to pursue, and which not.32 And these priority-setting decisions are
a critical part of the regulatory landscape; regulated industries pay close
26. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d).
27. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(4).
28. One critical factor in the economic analysis of procedure not specifically
addressed in this discussion is the magnitude of the consequences of the adjudication. The higher the
stakes, the more procedural costs may be justified - even assuming limited gains in accuracy. This logic
has an uneasy fit with the legal realities of procedures designed to be trans-substantive. Cf Robert M.
Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading ofthe Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718 (1975).
29. Crestview Parke Care Ctr. v. Thompson, 373 F.3d 743, 750 (6th Cir. 2004).
30. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. EPA, 35 F.3d 600, 606 (1st Cir. 1994);
see also Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 621 (1973) ("If this were a
case involving trial by jury as provided in the Seventh Amendment, there would be sharper limitations
on the use of summary judgment.").
31. See supra Section I.A.
32. See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, Accountability and Independence in Public
Enforcement 3 (Duke Law Sch. Public Law & Legal Theory Series, Paper No. 2016-23, 2016),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2748720 ("No government enforcers-at least not in the U.S.-have the
resources to pursue every possible violation of the law. They have to pick and choose, to set priorities
and goals."); Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, Foreword, Annual Review of
Administrative Law, 84 GEO. WASH. U. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (2016) ("[E]nforcement discretion is far
broader than a decision to move ahead against a party.").
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attention to even subtle signals from an agency about the direction of its
enforcement program.33 It seems plausible that a switch from a full-blown
hearing to administrative summary judgment might have some sort of impact
on these programmatic enforcement decisions, but the Consensus Justification
sidesteps the question.
Second, the Consensus Justification relies exclusively on a technocratic
tradeoff between accuracy and the costs of adjudication; when a costly hearing
would not enhance accuracy, the agency can skip it, regardless of what the
statute says.34 But accuracy and cost are not the only values embodied in
administrative procedure. When Congress selects procedures that an agency
must follow when implementing a legislative program, Congress may be
furthering a diversity of ends, just as when it passes substantive legislation.35
The Consensus Justification fails to provide any account for any values other
than the cost/accuracy tradeoff that may be motivating Congress's procedural
choices.
Third, the Consensus Justification vests substantial authority in
administrative prosecutors to calculate whether or not a full hearing is
36required. But there are reasons to doubt that these prosecutors will make this
calculation correctly. Administrative prosecutors have an interest in promoting
the cost-saving summary judgment procedure. The fact that they appear in
every case may create a repeat player effect, and give them the ability to "play
for the rules"-that is, select cases strategically to advance more permissive
rulings on the availability of administrative summary judgment.37 The ALJs
who review these judgments may not exercise adequate controls; they may be
33. E.g., Kate Andrias, The President's Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031,
1042-46 (2013); Lemos, supra note 32, at 17-19 (explaining "the functional equivalence of regulation
and enforcement").
34. See supra Section I.A.
35. See infra Section I.C.
36. See supra Section L.A.
37. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 L. & SOc'Y REV. 95 (1974); see also Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The
Repeat Player Effect, I EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189 (1997); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and
Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1704 (1996) ("[A]ctors who benefit more from inefficient
rules than from efficient rules have every incentive to litigate the latter while settling disputes arising
under the former . . . . [There is] ample reason to believe that repeat players can exploit the institutional
constraints binding courts in order to effect doctrinal changes that redistribute wealth to them.").
Galanter focused on ordinary civil litigation where certain parties tend to appear in
different cases in similar roles. Others have developed the argument further-tracing certain
developments in civil procedure to the strategic advantages of "repeat players." See Arthur R. Miller,
From Conley to Twombly to lqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE
L.J. 1 (2010) (discussing motions to dismiss); Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second
Thoughts about Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73 (1990) (summary judgment); see also Judith
Resnik, Mediating Preferences: Litigant Preferences for Process and Judicial Preferences for
Settlement, 2002 J. DIsP. RESOL. 155, 166-67 (2002) ("Procedural rulemaking has become another arena
to be captured by institutional interests. The effects of repeat-player defendants have been tracked in the
limitations imposed on discovery and in the promotion of non-court based decisionmaking."). There is
an even stronger basis to suppose it is true in the administrative context, where the government always




biased in favor of the agencies who employ them and may view the lawyers
who prosecute cases as colleagues.38
Fourth, the Consensus Justification relies on an analogy between
administrative and civil variants of summary judgment that is facile and
misleading.39 For one thing, the purposes underlying civil and administrative
procedure are not the same. As discussed more fully in the following section,
Congress sets administrative procedures to control the bureaucracy, a purpose
without direct parallel in the civil litigation context.
40 Further, some features of
administrative adjudication call for more protective procedures than civil
litigation, not less: as just discussed, administrative prosecutors may have the
incentive and ability to push for more permissive summary judgment. Article
III judges might well be reasonably trusted to wield the power of summary
judgment, which requires making a decision with less information than after a
full-blown hearing, without entailing that ALJs be similarly trusted.
4 1
Moreover, parties subjected to formal APA hearings do not have access to the
full panoply of discovery rights, and without effective discovery, a party
opposing an agency's motion for summary judgment is at a disadvantage.
38. For skeptical views of ALJ independence, see Jed S. Rakoff, Speech Before the
Practicing Law Institute: Is the S.E.C. Becoming a Law Unto Itself? (Nov. 5, 2014); Kent Barnett,
Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797, 799 (2013); Antonin Scalia, The ALI Fiasco-A
Reprise, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 57 (1979); Cf USV Pharm. Corp. v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. and Welfare,
466 F.2d 455, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (suggesting that "[a] vital distinction" between administrative
summary disposition and FRCP 56 "is that the Commissioner here was not an impartial arbiter of the
contentions of opposing parties, but was himself the moving party undertaking to support his own
proposed order"). For discussion of particular evidence of ALJ bias inside the SEC, see infra note 205.
39. See supra Section I.A.
40. See infra Section I.C.
41. See supra note 205 (discussing evidence of ALJ bias).
42. See MASHAW, ET AL., supra note 1, at 425 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 555(c)) (explaining
that the APA is "all but silent" on the topic of discovery, indicating only that subpoenas and other
investigative measures may be available "as authorized by law."); cf 16 C.F.R. § 3.33 (2016) (FTC
permits depositions); Amendments to the Commission's Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. 60,091 (Oct. 5,
2015) (SEC proposing to allow depositions); Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. United States, 391
F.3d 338 (1st Cir. 2004) (reviewing Nuclear Regulatory Commission moving away from depositions).
Indeed, early proposals to adapt summary judgment to the administrative context were explicitly limited
to those agencies that provided for effective discovery. Admin. Conf. of the United States, Summary
Decision in Agency Adjudication, Recommendation No. 70-3 (June 3, 1970); Gellhom & Robinson,
supra note 2, at 618.
The SEC recently promulgated changes to its rules of practice to allow for a limited
number of depositions by respondents in Administrative Proceedings. Amendments to the Commission's
Rules of Practice, Final Rules, 112-13, SEC Release No. 34-78319, 81 Fed. Reg. 50,212 (July 13, 2016);
see also infra notes 135-136 (discussing these rule changes).
At the same time, respondents in administrative proceedings have at least one procedural
protection that many civil litigants lack: the controls that operate on government enforcement agencies
governing the decision to file charges. Michael Asimow, Five Models ofAdministrative Adjudication, 63
AM. J. COMP. L. 3, 5 n.8 (2015); see also Ray Garrett, S.E.C. Chairman, Address at Southwestern Legal
Foundation, A Look at the SEC's Administrative Practice, Speech to SW Legal Foundation (Apr. 25,
1974) ("SEC administrative proceedings are seldom begun on a mere hunch . . . ."). In some cases, this
involves an airing of the possible charges before they are filed and a chance for the putative respondent
to refute them. E.g., 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c) ("Persons who become involved in ... [SEC] investigations
may . . . submit a written statement to the Commission setting forth their interests and position in regard
to the subject matter of the investigation."). By contrast, civil defendants may be subjected to all sorts of
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Finally, the analogy to the civil motion fails because enforcement
proceedings often bear a closer resemblance to criminal prosecutions than civil
proceedings.43 While ALJs do not have the power to incarcerate, they do hand
out significant penalties,44 including (in the case of the SEC), lifetime bars from
an entire area of the economy. For criminal sentencings, most jurisdictions
recognize defendant's right of allocution.45 Depriving an administrative
defendant of his statutory right to face the judge who will impose his
"sentence" conflicts with broadly accepted norms.46
The broad embrace of administrative summary judgment by scholars,
courts, and agencies thus rests on a faulty foundation. To account for the issues
ignored by the Consensus Justification, the next section considers
administrative summary judgment through an alternative theoretical lens.
C. Administrative Summary Judgment as Unstacking the Deck
Since the late 1980s, scholars have developed a theory of administrative
procedure as a mechanism of political control.47 When Congress delegates
enforcement to an administrative agency, it understands that the agency may
not adhere to its views and that future congressional oversight may push the
agency in different directions. The enacting Congress is aware of the risk of
"drift," and wants to do what it can to lock in its intentions for the enforcement
program.4 8
One way Congress achieves this control is by using administrative
procedures to "stack the deck," steering regulation in a particular direction by
frivolous, unintelligent, and baseless suits from private parties. (When the SEC prosecutes someone in
federal court, that person is similarly entitled to the Wells Process. But FRCP 56 is calibrated to all civil
litigation, not just those cases in which the government is the plaintiff.)
43. E.g., Steven R. Glaser, Statutes of Limitations for Equitable and Remedial Relief
in SEC Enforcement Actions, 4 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 129, 130-31 (2014).
44. The SEC would object to the terminology "penalty." Officially, bars are supposed
to be "remedial," not punitive.
45. 6 WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIM. PROC. § 26.4(g) (3d ed.) (collecting sources).
46. Cf, e.g., Arthur F. Matthews, Litigation and Settlement of SEC Administrative
Proceedings, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 215, 259-60 (1980) ("Since the Commission must tailor its sanction
to comply with public interest criteria, character witness testimony can constitute a crucial underpinning
of a respondent's trial strategy. In this respect, trial of the administrative proceeding resembles criminal
litigation much more than routine civil litigation.").
47. See Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of
Administrative Agencies, 8 J. L. EcON. & ORG. 93 (1992); McNollgast, Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987). For key elaborations, see
McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note 25. For applications, see for instance, Bressman, supra
note 25; Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 59
(1992); James T. Hamilton & Christopher H. Schroeder, Strategic Regulators and the Choice of
Rulemaking Procedures: The Selection of Formal vs. Informal Rules in Regulating Hazardous Waste, 57
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111 (1994); and McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 180 (1999).




building in a significant role for a particular interest group or constituency.49
This method is decentralized, relying on constituents and judicial review, rather
than future Congressional oversight.50 This decentralization is an important
advantage, since the enacting Congress obviously cannot rely on future
Congresses to enact its own vision of administrative oversight.
The procedural requirement of a full hearing is a form of deck-stacking
that can limit or channel enforcement programs. An agency's level of
enforcement is limited by, among other things, the agency's budget, the
49. "[T]he point of [deck-stacking] administrative procedures is not to preselect
specific policy outcomes, but to create a decisionmaking environment that mirrors the political
circumstances that gave rise to the establishment of the policy. Whereas political officials may not know
what specific policy outcome they will want in the future, they will know which interests ought to
influence a decision and what distributive outcomes will be consistent with the original coalitional
arrangement." McNollGast, Administrative Procedures, supra note 37, at 255. One McNollgast skeptic
listed the following examples of deck-stacking techniques: "mandatory consultation by the agency with
carefully constituted advisory committees or scientific panels; subjecting the agency to exogenous
control over its agenda"; requirements to produce impact statements"; "elaborate cost-benefit or
regulatory analyses before taking action"; "subsidies or cost reimbursements to certain kinds of
participants"; "legislative vetoes"; and "mandatory submission of a proposed rule to legislative
committees or to the drafters of the original bills." Michael Asimow, On Pressing McNollGast to the
Limits: The Problem ofRegulatory Costs, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., 127, 132 (1994).
Other procedures can facilitate "fire alarm" oversight, enabling constituencies bring
information about the bureaucracy to Congressional overseers before it becomes "fait accompli." See
Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols
versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SC. 165, 166 (1984) ("[Ilnstead of examining a sample of
administrative decisions, looking for violations of legislative goals, Congress establishes a system of
rules, procedures, and informal practices that enable individual citizens and organized interest groups to
examine administrative decisions (sometimes in prospect), to charge executive agencies with violating
congressional goals, and to seek remedies from agencies, courts, and Congress itself."); see also
McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note 25, at 434 ("A fire alarm converts the oversight job of a
politician from active monitor to reactive servant of affected constituencies."). Per McNollgast, the APA
allows an agency's attempts to alter policy "to be spotted earlier by constituents, giving political
officials more time to impose sanctions on errant bureaucrats." McNollGast, Administrative Procedures,
supra note 37, at 259-60; see also id. at 258 (noting that the APA's rulemaking requirements "ensure
that agencies cannot secretly conspire against elected officials by presenting them with a fait accompli,
that is, a new policy with already mobilized supporters"); Macey, Organizational Design, supra note 47,
(stating that the extra delay created by certain procedures provides a particular advantage to certain
constituencies).
The theory has been influential, though it has also been challenged on both theoretical
and empirical grounds. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 25, at 1752 (criticizing the PPT theory as relying
on a "simplistic" understanding of the role of the Court in the administrative procedure system);
Asimow, supra note 49, at 131 ("[W]hen groups that oppose agency action trip legislative fire alarms,
the fire will be doused (or fed or ignored) by the existing power balance in the legislature rather than by
the coalition that existed at the time the legislation was enacted."). For McNollgast's response to
Bressman, see McNollgast & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Administrative Law Agonistes, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 15 (2008). E.g., Steven J. Balla, Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the
Bureaucracy, 92 AM. POL. Sa. REV. 663, 669-71 (1998) (finding that notice-and-comment process did
not support deck-stacking theory). See also Bressman, supra note 25, at 1770 n. 127 (collecting empirical
challenges to deck-stacking).
50. "Procedures will only have their desired effect if their requirements are enforced
.... The courts thus play a key role in assuring political control . . . . Put another way, enforcement of
procedures is decentralized in that enforcement does not depend on the action of political principals."
McNollgast, Administrative Procedures, supra note 37, at 263; but see Bressman, supra note 25, at 1771
(finding that PPT scholars "have been unable to determine whether the Court has implemented
Congress's theoretical controls").
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substantive law, the agency's priorities, and the costs of enforcement.51
Administrative procedures factor into the costs of enforcement; more costly
adjudicatory procedures require the agency to allocate more resources towards
each enforcement action.52 Assuming a fixed budget, raising the cost of an
individual enforcement action will limit the number of actions the agency
pursues, or will channel its enforcement priorities in some way.
Suppose Congress is considering a new program and is divided on the
merits. Factions might reach a compromise (e.g., in the context of broader
legislative package) under which the contested program will be enacted subject
to limits on the level of enforcement. Giving expansive procedural rights to
defendants is one way congressional opponents could give effect to their
skeptical view of the underlying program.
Or, suppose Congress is united on the merits of the substantive program,
but wants to ensure that the agency concentrates its enforcement resources on
the most serious offenses and the most significant defendants. By imposing
costly procedures, Congress may hope to channel enforcement towards more
high-impact or high-stakes actions, where the benefits to the agency of a
victory are worth the high procedural costs, and away from low-impact ones,
which will not be worth the agency's time.
Viewed through this theoretical lens, administrative summary judgment
"unstacks the deck." By allowing the agency to circumvent the full hearing that
was required by Congress to limit or channel its enforcement program,
summary judgment facilitates a shift in that program and "drift" from the plans
of the original legislative coalition.54
51. E.g., James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An
Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 751-53 (2003); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 07-830,
SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO ENSURE PLANNED
IMPROVEMENTS ADDRESS LIMITATIONS IN ENFORCEMENT DIVISION OPERATIONS (2007) (noting that
SEC Enforcement Division officials blamed the backlog of cases in part on a scarcity of time and
administrative support); cf William Funk, Close Enough for Government Work?-Using Informal
Procedures For Imposing Administrative Penalties, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1993)
("Traditionally, this judicial model was the primary means provided for assessing a civil penalty. The
amount of government resources necessary to bring such a case, however, militates against using this
tool except in 'big' cases.").
52. See McNollgast, Administrative Procedures, supra note 37, at 262 ("[E]laborate
procedures with stiff evidentiary burdens for decisions and numerous opportunities for seeking judicial
review before the final policy decision is reached will benefit constituents that have considerable
resources for representation," and "cumbersome procedures exemplify deck-stacking in favor of well-
organized, well-financed interests.").
53. More streamlined procedures have the opposite effect. Justice Sotomayor recently
made a related point with regard to the impact of technology on the total level of enforcement. There,
she observed that because GPS monitoring technology was "cheap in comparison to conventional
surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that
constrain abusive law enforcement practices: 'limited police resources and community hostility."'
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Illinois v.
Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)).
54. It is true that the agency's authority to settle actions also allows it to bring more




The text and history of the APA support this theory. Courts and scholars
have devoted significant attention to the APA's distinction between "formal"
and "informal" adjudicationsss but the APA also provides a second key
distinction within formal adjudications. Section 556(d) provides (in part):
A party [in a formal adjudication] is entitled to present his case or defense
by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to
conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true
disclosure of the facts. In rule making or determining claims for money or
benefits or applications for initial licenses an agency may, when a party
will not be prejudiced thereby, adopt procedures for the submission of all
or part of the evidence in written form.
5 6
This section gives parties to formal APA adjudications57 an entitlement to
live, in person hearings,8 but provides a limited exception for certain classes.
59
there is a significant gulf between a settlement-which obviously depends on the consent of the
defendant-and a summary judgment-which does not.
55. E.g., Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 875-78 (1st Cir.
1978); City of W. Chi. v. NRC, 701 F.2d 632, 644-45 (7th Cir. 1983); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA,
873 F.2d 1477, 1480-83 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also WILLIAM F. FUNK, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & RUSSELL
L. WEAVER, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE: PROBLEMS AND CASES 195-98 (4th Ed.
2010); A GUIDE To FEDERAL AGENCY ADJUDICATION § 3.01 (Michael Asimow, ed. 2003) [hereinafter
ASIMow, GUIDE] (elaborating on the distinction between formal and informal adjudication). Scholars
have explored countless dimensions of the formal/informal divide. E.g., Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-
Adjudication: Is the Quest for Uniformity Faltering, 10 ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 65, 68 (1996); Paul R.
Verkuil, Reflections Upon the Federal Administrative Judiciary, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1341 (1992); Gary
J. Edles, An APA-Default Presumption for Administrative Hearings: Some Thoughts on "Ossifying" The
Adjudication Process, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 787 (2003); William S. Jordan Ill, Chevron and Hearing
Rights: An Unintended Combination, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 249, 273-74 (2009); Melissa M. Berry, Beyond
Chevron's Domain: Agency Interpretations of Statutory Procedural Provisions, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
541 (2007).
56. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (emphasis added).
57. Congress is free to avoid "formal adjudication" altogether. See supra note 55
(collecting sources on the formal/informal divide); see also Lubbers, supra note 55, at 70 (1996)
(expressing anxiety that Congress was too frequently avoiding formal adjudication).
58. ASIMow, GUIDE, supra note 55, at § 5.07 ("The APA generally contemplates an
oral hearing with 'live' presentation of evidence." (citing § 556(d))); 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 332-33 (2d ed. 1980) (stating that "a hearing on the record is the
equivalent of a trial ... it is governed by trial procedure" and "§ 556 clearly requires trial procedure");
Funk, supra note 51, at 2 (noting that formal APA adjudication "mirrors the trial in the judicially
imposed civil penalty").
59. Some courts have agreed with this reading. See, e.g., United States v. Fla. E. Coast
Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 241 (1973) ("[E]ven where the statute requires that the rulemaking procedure
take place 'on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing,' thus triggering the applicability of §
556, subsection (d) provides that the agency may proceed by the submission of all or part of the
evidence in written form if a party will not be 'prejudiced thereby."' (emphasis added)); Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 409 (1971) (finding, in a social security disability claim, that § 556(d) would
authorize the agency to "adopt procedures for the submission of all or part of the evidence in written
form" so long as the "party will not be prejudiced thereby"); NRDC v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 191 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (explaining that § 556(d) "explicitly exempts [initial licensing] from some elements of formal
adjudication"); Gencom Inc. v. FCC, 832 F.2d 171, 174 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (describing § 556(d) as an
"express exemption" from the "full panoply of trial-like hearing requirements embodied in § 554 of the
APA" for "processing applications of initial licenses."); Seacost Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572
F.2d 872, 879 (1st Cir. 1978) ("[T]he Administrator [is] empowered to require that the new evidence be
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A straightforward reading of the last sentence of this provision60 (guided by the
maxim of statutory interpretation, expressio unius61) is that, for formal
adjudications not involving one of the excepted classes-"rule making or
determining claims for money or benefits or applications for initial licenses"-
a party's "entitlement" to "present his case or defense by oral ... evidence" and
"conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true
disclosure of the facts" may not be abridged by the agency whether or not the
party would be "prejudiced thereby."62 The section therefore creates a
distinction within formal adjudications: the right to in-person, live hearings
may be dispensed with by the agency for licensing, rulemaking, and benefits
cases, but not for enforcement or disciplinary ones.
Courts have largely overlooked this provision. While a few of the cases
upholding administrative summary judgment fit into the exempted categories,
they do so without analysis of the provision.63 And several cases uphold the use
64of summary judgment beyond the specifically exempted categories.
This is not surprising. The distinction drawn by § 556(d) is difficult to
square with the Consensus Justification for administrative summary judgment
65that courts have uniformly adopted. On that view, Congress could not have
submitted in written form .... in cases of initial licensing."); Sierra Ass'n for Env't v. FERC, 744 F.2d
661, 664 (9th Cit. 1984) (relying on § 556(d) in approving a "paper hearing" procedure for licensing
application); see also MASHAW ET AL., supra note 1, at 425-26 ("[I]n connection with formal
rulemaking or initial license applications, the agency may limit the parties to written presentations
'when a party will not be prejudiced thereby."').
60. But see Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. 576 (2014)
(challenging the consensus that powers not enumerated in the constitution are reserved for the states).
61. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius stands for the proposition that the expression
of one thing means the exclusion of the other.
62. Cf AslMow, GUIDE, supra note 58, at § 5.07 ("The instances in which the agency
can dispense with oral proceedings are formal rulemaking, determinations relating to claims for money
or benefits, and applications for initial licenses.").
63. E.g., Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 620-23 &
n.19 (upholding summary judgment in a licensing case); United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S.
192, 205 (1956) (upholding denial of hearing in a licensing case where respondents fail to "set forth
reasons, sufficient if true" to justify relief, without discussing APA 556(d)); Puerto Rico Aqueduct &
Sewer Auth. v. EPA, 35 F.3d 600, (1st Cir. 1994) (broadly approving administrative summary judgment
in a licensing case without citing or discussing § 556(d)); see also FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 39,
45 (1964) (finding that the statutory hearing requirement did not preclude the FPC from denying
hearings ("barring at the threshold") to those who plainly were not entitled to relief, but also explicitly
holding that the denial of a hearing in this context was "not an 'adjudication' under APA); Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971) (benefits); Seacost Anti-Pollution League at 872
(licensing/permitting); Citizens for Allegan Cty., Inc. v. FPC, 414 F.2d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(licensing); Robbins v. Cyprus Cumberland Coal Co., 146 F.3d 425, 428-29 (6th Cir. 1998) (benefits).
64. See infra Part IlI; e.g., Komman v. SEC, 592 F.3d 173, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(SEC); Gibson v. SEC, 561 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2009) (SEC); Brownson v. SEC, 66 Fed. App'x 687, 688
(9th Cir. 2003) (SEC); Crestview Parke Care Ctr. v. Thompson, 373 F.3d 743, 750 (6th Cir. 2004)
(upholding rule "akin to the summary judgment standard contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56" for HHS civil penalty proceedings); cf Nat'l Indep. Coal Operators' Ass'n v. Kleppe, 423 U.S. 388,
399 (1976) (upholding the denial of a formal hearing before the assessment of a penalty, finding that a
mine operator who failed to request a hearing (as required under that statutory regime) "in effect
voluntarily defaulted and abandoned the right to a hearing").
65. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct, 35 F.3d at 605 (endorsing a version of the economic




intended to require agencies to expend scarce enforcement resources on futile
hearings.66 Thus, one court that adopted the Consensus Justification dismissed
this distinction drawn by § 556(d) as "sheer persiflage."67
But the distinction in § 556(d) is no puzzle under the Unstacking the Deck
view. The provision crystalizes Congress's intent to impose procedural costs on
agencies for a certain set of proceedings (e.g., enforcement actions, disciplinary
hearings), as a way to limit or channel enforcement programs. This purpose is
independent of whether the hearing enhances the accuracy of the outcome. By
requiring in person live hearings even where skipping such hearings would not
"prejudice" the respondent, Congress was limiting or channeling
enforcement.68
The legislative history confirms this theory. The history of the APA's
formal adjudication provisions shows that conservatives were attempting to use
these procedures to control agency enforcement programs.69 As one New Deal
Democrat explained, conservatives were attempting to use administrative
procedure to limit the reach of New Deal agencies: "Legislation which they
could not prevent they seek to frustrate . . . . [The bill] would tie up every
agency whose activities were not exempt from the provisions of the act."
70
Conservatives could not "prevent" the substantive New Deal legislation, so
they were attempting to "frustrate" it by imposing arduous procedures.
Similarly, a leading history of the APA concludes that "both Roosevelt
Democrats and conservatives recognized that a central purpose of the
proponents of administrative reform was to constrain liberal New Deal
agencies, especially the National Labor Relations Board and the Securities and
Exchange Commission."71 Section 556(d) isolates enforcement hearings
66. Congress may have decided that the stakes of licensing and benefits cases were
lower than for other adjudications, and so merited lower procedural costs. See supra note 28 (discussing
the role of penalty magnitude in economic procedural analysis). But that alone cannot explain why
Congress would have locked in formal procedures for all other cases, even where the hearings would be
futile.
67. Puerto Rico Aqueduct, 35 F.3d at 605.
68. This shows only that Congress was not behaving irrationally; it may or may not
have been behaving wisely. Cf Walter Gellhorn, The Administrative Procedure Act: The Beginnings, 72
VA. L. REV. 219, 232 (1986) ("'Judicialization' of administration is unlikely to be advantageous in every
setting, even where individual matters (as distinct from the shaping of future policies or the
announcement of general rules) are the business of the day."); Edward Rubin, It's Time To Make the
Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 98 (2003) (criticizing the APA as
imposing "excessive and counterproductive constraints on administrative agencies, while imposing too
little control on agency action to the detriment of both fairness and efficiency in the administrative
process").
69. See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act
Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996); see also Martin Shapiro, APA: Past,
Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 453 (1986); McNollGast, The Political Origins of the APA, supra
note 47, at 213; Lubbers, supra note 55, at 68 (describing formal adjudication procedure as the
"centerpiece" of the APA).
70. 86 CONG. REc. 4654 (1940).
71. Shepherd, supra note 69, at 1560; see also id. at 1606 (explaining that backers of
more restrictive proposed legislation "intended the bill to suppress disfavored New Deal agencies such
as the NLRB, the Labor Department's Wage and Hour Division, and the SEC"); id at 1678 ("[T]he
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involving the imposition of sanctions, such as unfair labor practice cases before
the NLRB and broker-dealer disciplinary hearings before the SEC-programs
72that attracted the particular ire of conservative opponents to the New Deal.
Their particular hostility towards these agencies explains why Congress would
want to preserve oral in person hearings-even "futile" ones-for these types
of cases.
D. The Two Theories Compared and Reconciled
The Consensus Justification valorizes administrative summary
judgment-it would be irrational to reject the procedure and insist on a "futile"
hearing.74 By contrast, the Unstacking the Deck view is merely descriptive.
Administrative summary judgment facilitates drift from the intent of the
original legislative coalition, but that may or may not be a good thing for
society. If the enacting Congress's decision to "stack" was welfare-enhancing,
then "unstacking" would be unwise. But the opposite could just as easily be
true. "Drift" is a political concept, not a utilitarian one.75
This apparent divergence between the scope of the two theories is actually
just an artifact of the misplaced assumption built into the scholarly versions of
the economic analysis that the underlying substantive law is welfare-
APA was a political compromise produced by a rugged political battle between conservatives and a
liberal administration-a compromise of a battle over conservatives' attempts to hinder liberal
administration programs by limiting the power of agencies to implement the programs."). Members of
Congress expressed this sentiment in debates over precursors to the APA. E.g., 86 CONG. REC. 4655
(statement of Rep. Keller) (criticizing precursor to APA) ("That is the intention of this bill - not only to
stop the NLRB but the Security and Exchange Commission .... That is what it is intended to do. They
admit that it will delay. They may as well admit the evident fact that if this bill should become law the
delay will be so great as to tie the hands of all these commissions, and delay often means defeat . . . . It
will stop the whole process of government along those lines."); but see JOEL SELIGMAN, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 153 (2003) (noting the SEC had "voluntarily" adopted key hearing
procedures when the APA was still being considered by congress, and so "the act itself resulted in
virtually no change in the Commission's procedures").
72. E.g., 86 Cong. Rec. 453 (1940) (statement of Rep. Cox) (floor debate on precursor
to APA) (attacking the SEC as having "the same philosophy as most of these new agencies that have
been set up in recent years, whose thinking is apparently rooted in doctrine that emanates from Russia");
86 Cong. Rec. 4603 (statement of Rep. Hawkins) (floor debate on precursor to APA) (comparing SEC to
"the tyrannies of the Gestapo of Germany, or the Russian OGPU . . .").
73. See also Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept ofAdministrative Procedure, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 258, 294-301 (1978) (noting that "efficiency may be a less important value" for
enforcement and disciplinary hearings than in other types of formal hearings); FUNK ET AL., supra note
55, at 206 ("The reason for the exception [for licensing] is the notion that in those types of cases there
are not normally adverse parties involved in the adjudication; it is only a party submitting evidence in its
support without any other party contesting it.").
74. See sources cited supra note 13-19 (collecting cases justifying summary judgment
in cases where requiring a hearing would be "futile," and thus irrational).
75. Some early PPT scholars seemed to assume that drift was a normative concept,
and that the original enacting Congress is the only politically legitimate source of law, and so any
deviation therefrom was undesirable. Later scholars backed away from this view. See discussion infra




enhancing.76 More (accurate) adjudications are better (setting aside procedural
costs) only if this underlying assumption holds. Though a useful way to present
an elegant theory of procedure, the assumption is not realistic. Some
substantive legal rules are welfare-diminishing. Enforcement of such "bad
laws" harms social welfare-and more enforcement is even worse.
77 A
procedure that obstructs the cost-effective, accurate enforcement of such a law
would be welfare-enhancing. Further, some laws are welfare-enhancing up to a
certain level of enforcement, but beyond that, welfare-diminishing. A
procedural regime that led the agency to prioritize "good" prosecutions and
deprioritize "bad" ones (or vice versa) could be welfare-maximizing, even
without maximizing the number of accurate adjudications.78
Once the assumption about the quality of the underlying law is relaxed,
the merits of administrative summary judgment are no longer solely dependent
on a simple calculation of the tradeoff between accuracy and costs, but rather
depend on the underlying program itself. As theories, Consensus Justification
and Unstacking the Deck thus are not as far apart as it seemed. Unfortunately,
when courts then draw on economic theory of procedure, they too often
overlook this assumption that underlies the scholarly analysis.
76. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV.
961, 1164-65 (2001) (identifying that "the relationship between legal procedure and the substantive law
that provides the underlying basis for lawsuits" is "central," because from that perspective procedure is
simply "the means by which substantive rules are ultimately enforced," and then proceeding to provide a
trans-substantive analysis of legal procedure); cf Klerman, supra note 22, at 354-55 (acknowledging
that the economic analysis of error costs is awkwardly applied to areas like anti-discrimination or
privacy, where "economic analysis is less clear or more controversial," but insisting that "to the extent
that discrimination and invasion of privacy can be conceived of as harms and those harms can be
monetized or expressed in a social welfare function, the economic analysis of procedure in terms of
direct costs and error costs is applicable").
77. Compare fig.1 and fig.2.
78. See fig.3.
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Figure 1: Good Law
Figure 2: Bad Law
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Figure 3: Mixed Law
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II. Indicia of Unstacking
The broad acceptance of administrative summary judgment rests on a
flawed intellectual foundation-one that fails entirely to account for any impact
on programmatic enforcement decisions, for any values behind Congress's
decision to require full hearings other than a tradeoff between accuracy and
cost, for the structural incentives that may skew administrative prosecutors'
decisions regarding what hearings are and are not required, or for the
distinctions between the civil and administrative applications of summary
judgment. The alternative theory, Unstacking the Deck, presents administrative
summary judgment as a mechanism to undo the procedural controls Congress
imposed on an agency enforcement program and as a battleground for
competing political agendas. It expects that agency prosecutors will wield this
tool in pursuit of political and programmatic goals.
Testing these rival theories requires some way to discern whether an
agency is relying on summary judgment to steer its enforcement program away
from an enacting Congress's intentions, and not just making individualized
determinations about summary judgment on a case-by-case basis. It also
requires determining whether agency prosecutors are conducting the
cost/accuracy calculation correctly, or are putting a thumb on the scale in favor
of more permissive summary judgment rules.
Neither of these claims is easily subject to direct testing.
79 Nevertheless, it
is possible to construct a rough proxy to test these two theories. This Part
79. Some have said the same about McNollgast's theory more generally. See Glen 0.
Robinson, Commentary on "Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies":
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presents four "indicia of unstacking" ("I-1," "1-2," etc.). To the extent an
agency's behavior conforms to these indicia, that would tend to indicate its
summary judgment program is serving as an instrument of programmatic
"drift" from an original enacting legislative coalition, and not merely of neutral
technocratic efficiency on a case-by-case basis. The factors are not exhaustive,
and also overlap to some extent.
1-1: Drifting agencies will develop summary judgment programs in
response to calls for increased or refocused enforcement.
Formal adjudicatory procedures limit or channel agency enforcement.
Summary judgment liberates the agency from those constraints. It allows
agency enforcers and adjudicators to do more with less, to bring and resolve
more actions without expending more resources. It also allows agencies to
pursue a different mix of actions; summary judgment may facilitate the
enforcement of certain rules that may not have been otherwise "worth" the
costs to the agency of enforcing. An agency seeking to cover more ground with
its enforcement program may find in summary judgment a useful tool.
One proxy for whether an administrative summary judgment is having a
programmatic effect on agency enforcement is whether the agency's use of the
procedure is a response to political calls for generally expanded enforcement.
Such calls could come from members of Congress, from within the executive
branch, or elsewhere. They could be the result of a broader political movement,
in response to some crisis or scandal, as a product of electoral politics, as a
reaction to (actual or perceived) agency failure, or from some other source.81
Summary judgment may be an appealing response to these calls for a stepped-
up enforcement presence without expending any extra resources.82
1-2: Drifting agencies will use summary judgment to boost enforcement
statistics.
Political Uses ofStructure and Process, 75 VA. L. REV. 483, 484 (1989) (criticizing McNollgast's model
as "too general in its description of processes and structure to permit useful generalizations about how
they can be used to 'stack the deck' in favor of specific political interests"); see also Bressman, supra
note 25, at 1770 n.127.
80. See Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group
Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDoZO L. REV. 909, 918 (1994) (noting "the
difficulty" of determining agency obsolescence, but developing general "indicia of agency
obsolescence" and then tracing these indicia through a particular agency-the SEC).
81. I am not thinking, here, of (for instance) the detailed and nuanced reports studies
and articles steadily issued by academics, industry, and others recommending certain priorities for
enforcers. Rather, I am thinking of the undifferentiated demands by non-experts, shaped primarily by
political or public relations considerations (rather than expert ones) that the enforcers simply do more or
do something concrete that shows they are "effective." This is likely a familiar driver of enforcement
programs for all students of enforcement, but perhaps especially to those who study securities. See, e.g.,
sources cited in note 146.
82. Administrative enforcement programs are shaped by a rich and complex set of
factors. In a recent normative paper, Professor Lemos distills these inputs down to a spectrum ranging
from "independence" and "accountability." The inputs I discuss here fall on the "accountability" side of
the spectrum. Unlike Lemos's discussion, however, this one is neither intended to criticize nor endorse
the proposition that agency enforcement should be shaped by current as opposed to original legislative




Relatedly, a drifting agency may take advantage of administrative
summary judgment to promote enforcement numbers that please their
legislative overseers. Agencies are required to provide regular performance
reports to Congress. 83 A drifting agency may recalibrate its enforcement
program to bring more actions amenable to administrative summary judgment
in order to boost its statistics and please Congress.
Unfortunately, a drifting agency may pursue this goal whether or not this
numerical goal is a meaningful measure of the quality of enforcement.84 As
"behavioral economics" has become a leading justification for government
intervention, scholars have drawn attention to the fact that the same biases
that skew the decision making of ordinary individuals also affect government
officials. The result, and the focus of literature on behavioral public choice, is
that "government policies often institutionalize rather than overcome
behavioral anomalies."86 Quantitative metrics like the "total number of cases
filed," the "win/loss record," or "total $ recovered" have been known to pose a
risk of unjustified certainty.8 They may lead to over-valuing that which can be
83. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78w(b)(1) (requiring the SEC, Federal Reserve, Comptroller of
the Currency, and FDIC to report annually to Congress "whatever . . . data" that the agency considers
relevant); Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, § 2(a), (b), Pub. L. No. 103-62 (requiring
agencies to measure performance results and report the results annually); see also Urska Velikonja,
Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC's Enforcement Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 901,
912-15 (2016).
84. See Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance, supra note 83, at 912 ("You get
what you measure. And what is measured is managed and rewarded, often to the exclusion of qualities
that cannot be measured.").
85. Psychologists have demonstrated that individuals suffer from systemic cognitive
biases, leading them to fail to act rationally. For a review, see DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND
SLOW (2011). These findings have led some to promote government interventions to mitigate these
biases. E.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). In particular, scholars have justified an expansive role for
the SEC with reference to the cognitive limitations of investors. E.g., LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE,
SELLING RISK, supra note 5); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance,
59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2002); Donald Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for
Law .from Behavioral Economics about Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CALIF. L. REV.
627 (1996); Donald Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral
Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 135, 153 (2002); Robert Prentice, The
Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 797-98 (2006); Robert Prentice, Whither
Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals for its Future, 51 DUKE L.J.
1397 (2002).
86. W. Kip Viscusi & Ted Gayer, Behavioral Public Choice: The Behavioral Paradox
of Government Policy 6 (Mercatus Working Paper, Mar. 2015); see also Stephen J. Choi & A.C.
Pritchard, The SEC's Shift to Administrative Proceedings: An Empirical Assessment, 34 YALE J. ON
REG. 1, 5 (2017) ("[I]f everyone suffers from cognitive defects, doesn't that also include the
commissioners and staff of the SEC?"). For an application of behavioral psychology findings to
different category of government employees (judges) see Alexander I. Platt, Debiasing Statutory
Interpretation, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 275 (2012).
87. E.g., MARK TWAIN, CHAPTERS FROM MY AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1906) ("'Figures
often beguile me,' he wrote, 'particularly when I have the arranging of them myself; in which case the
remark attributed to Disraeli would often apply with justice and force: 'There are three kinds of lies: lies,
damned lies, and statistics."'). Dan Kahan and colleagues have shown that even mathematically literate
people accord inappropriate weight to evidence that seem to confirm certain identity-constituting
political beliefs. Dan M. Kahan et al., Motivated Numeracy and Enlightened Self-Government, (Yale
Law Sch. Public Law Working Paper No. 317, 2013).
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readily measured (and undervaluing that which cannot be)-an error sometimes
referred to as the "drunkard's fallacy" or the "streetlight effect," after the joke
about the drunk searching for a lost object under a streetlight because "that's
where the light is."88 Summary judgment may facilitate an agency's ability to
produce the "right" numbers.89
1-3: Drifting agencies will use summary judgment to bring more minor
actions and target weaker defendants.
Drifting agencies want to avoid triggering backlash that will slow down
its drift. Thus, for instance, they will strive to avoid triggering "fire alarms" and
judicial review. Politically weak defendants can't pull fire alarms.
Economically weak defendants can't afford to pursue effective judicial review.
An enforcement agency with prosecutorial discretion must prioritize its
enforcement resources. In a regime without summary judgment, enforcement is
expensive: there are substantial fixed costs for each litigated proceeding.
Regardless of how easy a case is, the respondent will be entitled to an oral
hearing before an ALJ. The agency will be disinclined to waste scarce
resources on low-level cases. Even if many of them will settle, the few that do
not will prove not worth the procedural costs.
Summary judgment allows the agency to quickly dispose of the easiest
cases without the cost of a hearing even where the defendant refuses to settle.
By lowering the procedural costs of a given action, summary judgment
essentially empowers the agency to process cases, rather than adjudicate
them-functioning more like a DMV than a court.90 Summary judgment makes
enforcement cheaper, and thereby makes easy but trivial cases much more
attractive.
A drifting agency will incorporate this change in costs into its
enforcement program. It will bring more actions that are less significant and
target weaker defendants.
1-4: Administrative prosecutors at drifting agencies will "play for the
rules" to develop broad summary judgment programs through case-by-case
adjudication, not rulemaking.
88. Here's the joke:
Late at night, a police officer finds a drunk man crawling around on his hands and
knees under a streetlight. The drunk man tells the officer he's looking for his wallet.
When the officer asks if he's sure this is where he dropped the wallet, the man
replies that he thinks he more likely dropped it across the street. Then why are you
looking over here? the befuddled officer asks. Because the light's better here,
explains the drunk man.
David H. Freedman, Why Scientific Studies are So Often Wrong: The Streetlight Effect, DISCOVER MAG.
(Dec. 2010).
89. For a comprehensive discussion of manipulation of agency reporting data see
Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance, supra note 83; see also Barkow, Overseeing Agency
Enforcement, supra note 32, at 141.




According to the Consensus Justification, agency prosecutors are tasked
with determining whether a hearing is required in individual cases based on
whether the hearing would do anything to enhance the accuracy of the
outcome. But, as discussed above, these prosecutors have both the incentive
and the ability (because of their repeat player advantage inside administrative
adjudication) to "play for the rules"-that is, to obtain broader, more
permissive rules governing the use of summary judgment. And ALJs may not
be in a position to resist.91
In many agencies, adjudicatory procedural rules are ordinarily enacted
through APA notice and comment.92 But, for a drifting agency, advancing
permissive summary judgment rules via case-by-case adjudication may be
preferable. Rulemaking is the paradigm case for triggering the procedural
controls that a drifting agency is wise to avoid.93
Thus, agency prosecutors in a drifting agency will leverage their
procedural advantage inside case-by-case adjudication to develop favorable
rules governing summary judgment, rather than go through notice and
comment rulemaking.
These four indicia provide a baseline to challenge the explanatory power
of the Consensus Justification for administrative summary judgment, and to
explore the rival theory advanced here, Unstacking the Deck. The next Part
applies these indicia to a case study.
III. Case Study: SEC Summary Disposition
The SEC's Division of Enforcement enforces the securities laws in two
fora: civil proceedings in federal court and internal administrative
proceedings,94  a species of APA formal adjudication.95 Administrative
proceedings are presided over by ALJs and governed by the SEC's "Rules of
Practice."96
Much attention has lately focused on the Enforcement Division's shift
away from district court actions towards the Commission's own administrative
91. See supra note 205 (discussing ALJ bias).
92. E.g., Amendments to the Commission's Rules of Practice 80 Fed. Reg. 60,091
(Oct. 5, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 201).
93. E.g., McNollgast, Administrative Procedures, supra note 37, at 257-59.
94. The Division also makes referrals to the Department of Justice for criminal
prosecutions. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b); see also 2 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF,
SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK § 26:56 (2014 ed.).
95. See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 96 n.13 (1981); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-
1(g)(1), 78o(b)(4), 78u-2(a)(1) & (2), 80a-9(d), 80b-3(f) (requiring a hearing "on the record").
96. 17 C.F.R. § 201.100 et seq. "Respondents" (individuals charged in APs) can
appeal an adverse decision by an ALJ to the Commission itself, and then can appeal that decision to a
U.S. Court of Appeals. For a recent overview of APs, see Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial
Industry, 67 Bus. L. 679 (2012).
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forum.97 After the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act expanded the penalties available
inside these administrative proceedings,98 the SEC began ramping up its use of
these internal proceedings where it enjoys substantial procedural advantages
and its success rate has been higher.99 This shift has been greeted with outrage
among key stakeholders and opinion-leaders,'00 culminating in a wave of broad
constitutional challengeso10  and calls to overhaul the procedures governing
these proceedings.102
Both lines of attack-constitutional challenge and procedural reform-
call for careful attention to administrative proceedings as they operate in
practice.103 Several studies have looked at the Enforcement Division's choice
of forum (administrative proceedings versus district courts) and its comparative
success rate in each.104 Others have looked at the nature of actions pursued,
characteristics of respondents, and the size of penalties.'05 Still others have
97. See Platt, supra note 4.
98. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 925, 929P, Pub.
L. No. 111-203 (2010); see also Platt, supra note 4, at 7.
99. See, e.g., Platt, supra note 4, at 8-11; see also Choi & Pritchard, supra note 86;
David T. Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEXAS L. REV. 1155 (2016).
100. E.g., Jed S. Rakoff, Speech Before the Practicing Law Institute: Is the SEC
Becoming a Law Unto Itself? (Nov. 5, 2014); see also SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 34 F.
Supp. 3d 379, 380 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (Rakoff, J.).
101. E.g., Lucia v. SEC, No. 15-1345, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Jarkesy v. SEC,
803 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2015) aff'g 48 F. Supp. 3d 32 (D.D.C. 2014); Chau v. SEC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 417
(S.D.N.Y. 2014); Stilwell v. SEC, 14-cv-7931 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 1, 2014); Peixoto v. SEC, 14-cy-
8364 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 20, 2014); Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2015), aff'g 2015 WL 905349
(E.D. Wis. Mar. 3, 2015); Decision & Order, Duka v. SEC, 15-cv-357 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2015), ECF
No. 57; Hill v. SEC, Nos. 15012831, 15-13738 (11th Cir. Jun. 17, 2016), rev'g Order, Gray Fin. Grp. v.
SEC, 15-cv-492 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015), ECF No. 56 and rev'g 114 F. Supp 3d 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2015);
Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016), aff'g 15-cv-2472, 2015 WL 4006165 (S.D.N.Y. June 30,
2015); Order, Spring Hill Capital Partners, LLC v. SEC, 15-cv-4542 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2015), ECF
No. 23; Order, Timbervest v. SEC, 15-cv-2106 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4,2015), ECF No. 25.
102. The SEC very recently enacted some reforms to dispositive motions, the timing
of proceedings, depositions, hearsay and some other areas. See Amendments to the Commission's Rules
of Practice, Final Rule SEC Release No. 34-78319 (July 13, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2016/34-78319.pdf. Time will tell if these changes quell the mounting
insurrection. See Platt, supra note 4, at 39-40 (arguing the proposed rules were inadequate).
103. In a recently denied Appointments Clause challenge to the SEC's ALJ system, an
amicus brief filed by Paul Clement cites this Article's findings (pre-reported in an earlier-published
Article) regarding the low rate of success for respondents in summary disposition as evidence that the
SEC Administrative Proceedings' procedural system is unfair. Brief of Amici Curiae Ironridge Global
IV, Ltd. at 12, 14, Lucia v. SEC, No. 15-1345 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 29, 2016),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3009036/Clement-Brief-SEC-ALJ.pdf
104. E.g., Choi & Pritchard, supra note 86; Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins With In-House
Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015); Jean Eaglesham, SEC Is Steering More Trials to Judges It
Appoints, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2014); see generally Platt, supra note 4. For a criticism of the Wall
Street Journal studies see Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance, supra note 83, at 976 nn.414-16.
105. See, e.g., Gadinis, supra note 96; Cox & Thomas, supra note 51; Sonia A.
Steinway, Comment, SEC "Monetary Penalties Speak Very Loudly, " But What Do They Say? A Critical
Analysis of the SEC's New Enforcement Approach, 124 YALE L.J. 209, 210 (2014); see also Urksa





looked at the agency's changing settlement practice.o But to date, little
attention has been paid to the details of the procedural mechanics inside
litigated administrative proceedings.
A close look yields a surprising result: over the last decade, SEC
administrative proceedings have quietly become comprised of two separate
procedural regimes, operating side by side. Under the first, respondents receive
an oral hearing, including the right to confront the adjudicator in person, to
cross-examine government witnesses, and to take the stand to plead innocence
or beg for forgiveness. Under the second, they get none of the above. This
bifurcation is the product of the Enforcement Division's innovative use of the
"Motion for Summary Disposition,"l07 a form of administrative summary
judgment. To date, the Division's expansive reliance on summary disposition
has been largely overlooked even by the most eager critics of the agency's
-108
enforcement practice.
This Part examines SEC summary disposition as a case study to test the
Unstacking the Deck theory. Section A documents the agency's development
of a summary disposition program using an original dataset comprised of every
successful use of the motion from 1996 through 2014. Section B reviews this
development through the lens of the Consensus Justification and shows how
courts have relied on this framework in upholding the practice. Section C uses
the Unstacking the Deck theory to offer a more complete account for the rise of
summary disposition. 09
106. Urska Velikonja, Securities Settlements in the Shadows, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM
124 (2016).
107. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.250.
108. There are exceptions. Some have recognized the trend of SEC summary
disposition. See Luke T. Cadigan, Litigating an SEC Administrative Proceeding, 58 BOSTON BAR J. 8,
12 (Jan. 7, 2014) (noting in passing that "summary disposition is usually reserved only for follow-on
actions . . . or those seeking to revoke registration of securities"); 70 Fed. Reg. 72,566, 72,567 (2005)
(acknowledging that summary disposition motions "are often made in cases where a respondent has
been criminally convicted"); 6 THOMAS HAZEN, LAW SEC. REG. § 16.11 ("[S]anctions can be imposed
without a hearing where there is no factual dispute, as is the case for example with respect to a statutory
disqualification based on a criminal conviction."); see also Kornman, 592 F.3d at 182. More have noted
that summary disposition is generally unavailable for respondents. See Cadigan, supra, at 12 ("As a
practical matter, there are also no dispositive motions prior to the hearing."); William F. Johnson &
Amelia R. Medina, SEC's Administrative Enforcement Intensifies Fairness Debate, 252 N.Y. L.J. (Nov.
6, 2014), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202675574765/SECs-Administrative-
Enforcementlntensifies-Faimess-Debate?slretum=20150826104029 ("[N]o dispositive motion practice
prior to the hearing, with rare exceptions."); see also Compl. ¶ 37, Peixoto; Compl. T 29, Gray Fin.
Grp.; Compl. ¶ 23, Duka. But see Order on Mot. for Partial Summary Disposition, OX Trading, LLC, 3-
14853, (Sept. 5, 2012) (Murray, C.J.) (quoting SEC Rules of Practice, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
35833, 60 Fed. Reg. 32,738, 32,767-68 (June 23, 1995)) ("In 1995, when the Commission began to
allow motions for summary disposition, . . . it expected that summary disposition would be 'sought or
granted . . . comparatively rare[ly].' However, much has changed in the last almost twenty years, and
successful motions for summary disposition are no longer rare.").
109. This study is limited to a single agency. In a separate paper, I look at the
summary judgment practices of other enforcement agencies, including FTC and CFTC. This paper is
also limited to successful uses of summary disposition, rather than all uses of the motion. The reason is
purely practical: grants of summary disposition are more reliably published on the SEC website and
Westlaw than the motions themselves or denials.
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A. The Rise of SEC Summary Disposition
Since 1995,110 the SEC's Rules of Practice have authorized "the
respondent or the interested division" in an AP to "make a motion for summary
disposition of any or all allegations" before the hearing "with leave of the
hearing officer." M An ALJ reviewing such a motion must take as true "[t]he
facts of the pleadings of the party against whom the motion is made."11 2
In the first nineteen years after its introduction in 1995, motions for
Summary Disposition grew into an increasingly important feature of the SEC's
enforcement program.11 3 By the mid 2000s, summary dispositions accounted
for a significant portion of the agency's litigated cases. This has essentially
bifurcated administrative proceedings: on the first track, respondents are
entitled to a live hearing, at which they can take the stand and subject the
government's witnesses to cross-examination; on the second, they get none of
the above.
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110. See 1995 Fed. Reg. SEC Rules; see also Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v.
EPA, 35 F.3d 600, 606 n.5 (1st Cir. 1994) (identifying the SEC as an outlier among agencies for not
providing for administrative summary judgment in 1994).
111. 17 C.F.R. § 201.250(a).
112. Id.
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114. Although not all summary disposition grants are contained in Initial Decisions
(some are contained in "Orders" or "Rulings" not titled "Initial Decisions"), Initial Decisions provide a
useful comparator for the rate of pro-SEC Summary Dispositions over this period. The final year of data
is skewed by the fact that the SEC brought more primary actions in the administrative forum rather than
in federal court. Since summary disposition is most frequently used in follow-ons, the percentage
resolved on summary disposition in this year shrinks dramatically.
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Successful uses of the motion are overwhelmingly made by the
Enforcement Division. Respondents have won outright dismissal through
116
pre-hearing summary disposition on a mere five occasions,l one of which was
promptly reversed by the Commission.117 By contrast, the Enforcement
Division has won summary disposition nearly 200 times.18
Because cases resolved on summary disposition take up much less time-
for the Enforcement Division, the ALJ, and the respondent-they serve as a
"force multiplier," enabling the agency to pursue more cases and resolve them
more quickly, by dispensing with the costly procedural rights of formal
adjudication."19
Table 1: Summary Disposition Grants, FY 1996-2014




The penalties that can be imposed on summary disposition are not
restricted. Two thirds of summary dispositions granted for the agency have
involved some sort of bar.120 This is notable, given that as discussed above, the
current controversy around administrative proceedings was triggered by the
legislative expansion of the SEC's penalty authority in that forum, including
the power to bar individuals from the entire securities industry (so-called
"collateral bar" authority).121
115. See tbl.1.
116. See In re Ernst & Young, LLP, 3-10786 (July 2, 2002) (Ruling); In re
Information Architects Corp., 3-11822, No. 299 (Oct. 25, 2005) (Initial Decision); In re Salvatore F.
Sodano, 3-12596, No. 333 (Aug. 20, 2007) (Initial Decision); In re Diatect Int'l Corp., 3-12843, 3-
12843, No. 344 (Jan. 30, 2008) (Initial Decision); In re Vokonics, Inc., 3-13918, No. 405 (Oct. 22,
2010).
117. In re Salvatore F. Sodano, 3-12596, Rel. No. 59141 (Dec. 22, 2008) (Comm'n).
118. See tbl.1.
119. Another driver of the SEC's use of summary disposition is the rate at which
defendants contest the charges brought against them. Where defendants are willing to settle cases,
summary disposition is not needed. Thus, as the rate of contested cases increases, the rate of summary
disposition would also increase.
120. See tbl.2.
121. Dodd-Frank, § 925, 929P; see also Chad Howell, Back to the Future: Applying
the Collateral Bars of Section 925 of the Dodd-Frank Act to Previous Bad Acts, 7 J. Bus. & TECH. L.
285, 288 (2012) ("Essentially, the Commission is now authorized to put an individual completely out of
the regulated securities business, even out of areas that had nothing to do with the violation of the




Table 2: Penalties Imposed on Summary Dispositions, FY 1996-2014
Granted Motions for Division 186
Bar 125
Accountant Bar122  3
Attorney Bar 1 23  3
Collateral Bar 24  45
BD Bar1 25  45
IA Bar1 26  33
Disgorgementl27  7
Civil Penalties1 28  4
Cease and Desistl29  9
Revoked Registration Onlyl30 57
Though the rule is not formally confined to any particular category of
cases, 1 the Division has used summary disposition predominantly in two
categories of cases: follow-on proceedings and delinquent filings.132
Follow-on Proceedings. Securities-related violations can be pursued as
criminal prosecutions by DOJ, as civil or administrative proceedings by the
SEC, as various types of actions by state and foreign enforcement authorities,
or as civil actions by private parties. After one of these actions ends in a
conviction, a guilty plea, or a finding of liability, the SEC may file a "follow-
on" administrative proceeding to impose an additional penalty. Between 1996
and 2014, nearly two-thirds of summary dispositions granted for the Division
were in these cases.
Delinquent Filings. When issuers are delinquent in their periodic filings,
the SEC can bring an AP to suspend or revoke the registration.133 The penalty
is based in part on an assessment of various factors, including whether the
122. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e).
123. Id.
124. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(6)(A), 78o-4(c)(4), 78q-l(c)(4)(C), 80b-3(f).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(6) (before Dodd-Frank).
126. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(f) (before Dodd-Frank).
127. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1(e), 78u-3(e), 80b-3(j), 80a-9(e).
128. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-9(f), 80b-3(k), 78u-3, 77h-1.
129. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-3, 80b-3(k).
130. 15 U.S.C. § 781(j).
131. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.250.
132. See figs.7, 8 & 10.
133. See Exchange Act § 13(a); see also Kevin Smith, Sey-Hyo Lee & Tae Sang Yoo,
What Late SEC Filers Need To Know: 2013 Edition, CORP. PRAC. NEWSWIRE (July 2013) (describing
administrative proceedings seeking revocation for late filings as "uncommon" and "typically aimed at
recurring and egregious violations"). The Division of Enforcement has a branch dedicated to delinquent
filings. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Delinquent Filings Program (Oct. 25, 2005),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/delinquent.htm.
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issuer is likely to resolve the delinquency.134 Between FY 1996-2014, nearly
one-third of summary dispositions granted for the Division were in these cases.
Figure 7: Summary Dispositions for Division by Category, FY 1996-2014
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134. See Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1140 (5th Cir. 1979), affd on other
grounds, 450 U.S. 91 (1981); see also infra notes 195.
Unstacking the Deck
In July 2016, the SEC adopted certain changes to the Rules of Practice,
including changes to the rules governing dispositive motions inside APs. These
changes appear calibrated to make these motions modestly more available to
Respondents than they have been in the past.135 Because these rules do not do
anything to temper the Enforcement Division's own use of such motions,i3
they do not impact the analysis here.
B. SEC Summary Disposition: The Consensus Justification
Several courts have examined the SEC's use of summary disposition and
have upheld the practice by relying on a version of the consensus justification
sketched above.1 37 In Kornman v. SEC, the D.C. Circuit upheld summary
disposition in a follow-on proceeding, finding the "central issue" (i.e., the
underlying violation) had already been resolved by the respondent's prior
criminal conviction, and that, on the remaining issues related to his penalty,
respondent enjoyed an adequate substitute to a hearing: "the opportunity to
challenge the arguments and evidence proffered by the Division .. . by filing an
opposition [brief] and filing documents."'3 8 Similarly, in Gibson v. SEC,
another follow-on case, the Sixth Circuit approved summary disposition
because the respondent had enjoyed an adequate substitute for a hearing on his
penalty: an opportunity to submit mitigating evidence by attaching declarations
to his opposition brief-declarations which "both the ALJ and the Commission
135. The new Rules of Practice give parties two new tools with regard to dispositive
motions, neither of which was included in the September 2015 proposed rules. First, parties now have
the right to file a motion for a ruling on the pleadings to attack the Commission's legal theories
underlying the prosecution without seeking leave from the ALJ to do so. See Amendments to the
Commission's Rules of Practice, Final Rules at 52, 112-13, SEC Release No. 34-78319, 81 Fed. Reg.
50, 212 (July 13, 2016) (adopting new Rule 250(a)). Second, parties can now file interlocutory appeals
to the Commission from denials of leave to file a motion for summary disposition. Id. at 57 n.122. The
Commission deserves praise for making these changes, which will give respondents a way to test novel
and untested theories of liability when advanced in administrative proceedings. These reforms are
similar to ones I proposed in a previous paper. See Platt, supra note 4 (proposing reforms designed to
give respondents a realistic way to attack the Commission's legal theories before a neutral adjudicator).
However, the Commission rejected other proposals that would have made these motions even more
effective tools for respondents. See SEC Release at 50-60.
136. The narrative portion of the Final Rule quietly seeks to cement and confirm the
agency's authority to bring Summary Disposition motions in follow-on proceedings-though the rule
itself does not do so. 81 Fed. Reg. 50,212, at 50,224 (noting in passing that "we have repeatedly
observed that summary disposition is typically appropriate [in follow-on proceedings] because the issues
to be decided are narrowly focused and the facts not genuinely in dispute"). As I discuss below, the use
of summary dispositions in follow-ons is actually questionable, even through the lens of the Consensus
Justification. See infra text accompanying notes 195-199.
137. Kornman v. SEC, 592 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Gibson v. SEC, 561 F.3d 548
(6th Cir. 2009); Brownson v. SEC, 66 Fed. App'x 687, 688 (9th Cir. 2003).
138. 592 F.3d at 183.
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took ... as true."'39 The court found it "difficult to see how live testimony ...
would affect the sanctioning determination."l40
These courts followed the pattern established by earlier cases upholding
administrative summary judgment in other contexts.141 They evaluate the use
of summary judgment in the individual case before them, disregarding any
possible programmatic impact on the agency's enforcement priorities. They
emphasize the tradeoff between accuracy and costs, disregarding any other
possible interests or values embedded in administrative procedure. And they
assign primary responsibility to the administrative prosecutor to determine
whether a hearing is or is not required, disregarding any possible reasons to
doubt that this prosecutor faces structural incentives that prevent him from
making this calculation fairly.
C. SEC Summary Disposition: Unstacking the Deck
When Congress allocates claims or penalties to an SEC administrative
proceeding, it does so with an understanding of the various limits on how
broadly those penalties will be enforced, including the agency's enforcement
budget, rival agency priorities, and the costs of enforcement.142 Recall APA
139. 561 F.3d at 553-54.
140. Id. at 554.
141. See supra Section I.A. E.g., Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, Inc.,
412 U.S. 609, 611 (1973) (upholding the FDA's "administrative summary judgment procedure" for
hearing regarding withdrawal of agency approval of New Drug Application); United States v. Storer
Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956) (upholding the rule that the FCC must conduct an oral hearing
when denying initial license applications only when the party requesting a hearing has "set forth reasons,
sufficient if true, to justify a change or waiver of the Rules"); Chauffeur's Training Sch., Inc. v.
Spellings, 478 F.3d 117, 131 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding a paper hearing conducted by the Department of
Education for a civil penalty); Crestview Parke Care Ctr. v. Thompson, 373 F.3d 743, 750 (6th Cir.
2004) (upholding a rule "akin to the summary judgment standard contained in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56" for HHS civil penalty proceedings); Robbins v. Cyprus Cumberland Coal Co., 146 F.3d
425, 428-29 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating, in passing, that, in the context of a benefits proceeding, there must
be an in-person hearing "in person" "absent waiver or a proper grant of a motion for summary
judgment"); Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. EPA, 35 F.3d 600, 604 (1st Cir. 1994) (upholding
use of summary disposition procedure, "very similar to the requirement set forth in Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" in EPA permit hearings); Veg-Mix, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Ag., 832
F.2d 601, 607-08 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (affirming the Agriculture Department's denial of an evidentiary
hearing under its procedural rules, which allowed the Department to "dispense with a hearing when no
answer is filed," because there was no material issue of fact); Citizens for Allegan Cty., Inc. v. FPC, 414
F.2d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1969); (authorizing FPC licensing transfer in a hearing conducted with
"abbreviated procedure" and explicitly analogizing to FRCP 56).
Courts have also found the right to an in-person hearing was conditioned upon a proper
request. Costle, 445 U.S. 198 (upholding EPA's rule conditioning the availability of a hearing on party's
"identification of a disputed issue of material fact"); Nat'l Indep. Coal Operators'Ass'n v. Kleppe, 423
U.S. 388, 399 (1976) (upholding denial formal hearing before assessment of a penalty, finding that a
mine operator who failed to request a hearing "in effect voluntarily defaulted and abandoned the right to
a hearing"). The cases on SEC Summary Disposition relied heavily on these non-SEC cases. E.g.,
Kornman, 592 F.3d at 182 (citing Costle, Hynson, Storer, and Puerto Rico Aqueduct).
142. SEC administrative proceedings are species APA formal adjudication. E.g.,
sources cited supra note 95. Kornman appears to suggest that hearings under 15 U.S.C. § 80(b)-3(f) are
not governed by the APA. Kornman 592 F.3d at 182. This appears to be wrong. See Steadman v. SEC,




§ 556(d) which draws a distinction between certain categories of formal
proceedings where agencies could avoid hearings "if no prejudice" from others.
Since administrative proceedings are neither "rule making" nor "claims for
money or benefits" nor "applications for initial licenses," Congress would
understand that claims allocated to administrative proceedings would not be
exempted from the oral hearing requirement under APA § 556(d).143 Thus,
Congress would have expected that enforcement of that claim would be limited
or channeled by those procedural constraints.1 44
By systematically dispensing with these procedures in a subset of cases,
the agency's use of summary disposition dispenses with Congress's judgment
regarding its enforcement program. Summary judgment unstacks the deck,
freeing the agency to pursue an expanded and refocused enforcement program.
This Section analyzes the SEC's summary disposition practice in light of
the four indicia listed above. It suggests that the SEC's use of summary
disposition provides a case-in-point of Unstacking the Deck.
I-1: Drifting agencies will develop summary judgment programs in
response to calls for increased or refocused enforcement.
SEC enforcement is reactive to political forces.145 Market crashes generate
a public outcry, which, in turn, often produces a political coalition that passes
new securities regulation and often bolsters enforcement.146
The rise of SEC summary disposition appears to be no exception. The
aggressive program of summary disposition may have been a response to calls
for expanded enforcement. Though the summary disposition rule was created in
1995, it was not until 2002, when the agency was grappling with the public and
congressional fallout from the Enron scandal, that the agency began its program
143. APA § 556(d); see also supra Section I.C. Some administrative proceedings
revoke registrations, but that is not "initial licensing." Some administrative proceedings extract civil
penalties, but this is not a "claim for money or benefits." But see Chauffeur's Training Sch., Inc., 478
F.3dat 131.
144. The Securities Laws have been amended many times since the APA was enacted
in 1946, including several enactments that expanded the agency's administrative enforcement powers in
a number of ways. See, e.g., Platt, supra note 4 (discussing 1990, 2002, and 2010 legislation expanding
the SEC's administrative enforcement powers). But each time Congress has expanded the agency's
enforcement powers, Congress has also left in place the APA as the procedural architecture governing
administrative adjudications at the SEC, and has not purported to alter that regime.
145. E.g., Velikonja, Politics in Securities Enforcement, supra note 105.
146. E.g., Stuart Banner, What Causes Securities Regulation? 300 Years ofEvidence,
75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849 (1997); Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in REGULATORY
BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION (Cary Coglianese, ed. 2012)
[hereinafter Romano, Regulating in the Dark]; see also Roberta Romano, Further Assessment ofthe Iron
Law of Financial Regulation: A Postscript o Regulating in the Dark, ECGI Working Paper Series in
Law (Nov. 2014); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
268-69 (2012) (criticizing "federal bubble laws" intervening in state corporate law as "enacted in a
climate of political pressure that does not facilitate careful analysis of costs and benefits," "driven by
populist anti-corporate emotions," and "often derived from prepackaged proposals advocated by policy
entrepreneurs skeptical of corporations and markets"); PAUL G. MAHONEY, WASTING A CRISIS: WHY
SECURITIES REGULATION FAILS 7 (2015) (arguing that "the aftermath of a financial crisis is a bad time to
redesign the regulatory framework").
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of summary disposition. There were many calls for stepped up SEC
147enforcement. These culminated in new securities legislation, but this
legislation left in place the formal procedural architecture for administrative
proceedings-including the statutory limitation on summary adjudication in
§ 556(d). Nevertheless, these developments may have driven the agency to take
an aggressive new enforcement approach of using summary adjudication to
expand its footprint.
1-2: Drifting agencies will use summary judgment to boost enforcement
statistics.
Summary disposition has facilitated the SEC's ability to maximize the
number of enforcement actions filed each year. Keeping that number as high as
possible-and especially beating last years' number-appears to be a central
component of the agency's lobbying platform.148 In recent years, the first pages
of the agency's annual reports to Congress have proclaimed:
* A "record number of cutting edge enforcement actions"
(2014); 149
* "hundreds of enforcement actions" (2013); 150
151* "a near-record number of actions" (2012);
* "more cases than ever previously filed by the Division in a single
fiscal year" (2011);152
* "the second-highest number of enforcement actions in agency
history" (2008). 153
147. See, e.g., Romano, Regulating in the Dark, supra note 146; Paul S. Atkins &
Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission: A Critical Review of the History and Evolution of the SEC
Enforcement Program, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 367, 394-400 (2008).
148. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Distorting Incentives Facing the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 639, 639 (2010) (explaining that the "SEC's
performance is measured by Congress and in the court of public opinion on the simplistic basis of how
many cases it brings and on the size of the fines it collects"); see also Velikonja, Reporting Agency
Performance, supra note 83, at 911-12 ("Agencies like the SEC are under considerable pressure from
Congress to increase their enforcement output year after year without additional appropriations, so
perhaps it should come as no surprise that agencies sometimes use fuzzy numbers to meet unreasonable
expectations.").
149. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, FISCAL YEAR 2014 AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT 2;
see also id. at 10 (the agency "ended FY 2014 with 755 enforcement actions .... ).
150. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, FISCAL YEAR 2013 AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT 2;
see also id. at 17 ("The SEC ended the fiscal year with 686 enforcement actions, including 402 in the
last six months of the year.").
151. U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, FISCAL YEAR 2012 AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT 2;
see also id at 13 ("The SEC brought 734 enforcement actions in FY 2012, the second highest number
ever filed in a fiscal year (and one less than the 735 filed the prior year).").
152. U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, FISCAL YEAR 2011 AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT 2.
153. SEC Announces Fiscal 2008 Enforcement Results, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE




Agency leaders have testified before Congress, claiming "the highest
number of enforcement actions to date, 755" in 2015;154 "686 enforcement
actions" in 2014; 155 and "735 enforcement actions-more than the SEC has
ever filed in a single year," in 2012.156
Public speeches 15 and commentary by agency leaders reflect a similar
emphasis on quantity, as do agency press releases.'59 The press often echoes the
emphasis on the raw total enforcement number.160
154. Examining the SEC's Agenda, Operations and FY 2016 Budget Report, Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 114th Cong. 49 (2015) (statement of Mary Jo White, Chair,
SEC); see also Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request of the US. Securities and Exchange Commission,
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Appropriations, Subcomm. on Fin. Services and Gen. Gov't, 114th
Cong. 54 (2015) (Statement of Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC) ("The Division of Enforcement continued to
achieve significant results, filing 755 enforcement actions . . . ."); 2016 Budget Request of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Appropriations, Subcomm. on
Fin. Services and Gen. Gov't Comm. on Appropriations, I 14th Cong. 67 (2015) (statement of Mary Jo
White, Chair, SEC) (same); Oversight of the SEC's Division Enforcement, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Capital Markets and Gov't Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Fin. Serys., 114th
Cong. 47 (2015) (Statement of Andrew Ceresney, Div. of Enforcement Director).
155. Oversight of the SEC's Agenda, Operations and FY 2015 Budget Request,
Hearing before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 62 (2014) (Statement of Mary Jo White,
Chair, SEC).
156. Examining the Settlement Practices of U.S. Financial Regulation, Hearing before
the H. Comm. on Financial Serys., 112th Cong. 71 (2012) (Statement of Robert Khuzami, Director,
Division of Enforcement); SEC Oversight, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., Subcomm. on
Capital Markets and Gov't Sponsored Enterprises and Subcomm. on Fin. Institutions and Consumer
Credit, Il2th Cong. 60 (2012) (Statement of Chairman Mary L. Schapiro); see also Fiscal 2013
Appropriations, H. Comm. on Appropriations, Subcomm. On Fin. Servs. And Gen. Gov't, 112th Cong.
(2012) (Statement of Chairman Mary L. Schapiro) (same); Management and Structural Reforms at SEC:
A Progress Report, Hearing before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Subcomm.
on Securities, Insurance, and Investment, 112th Cong. 174 (2011) (Statement of Robert Khuzami,
Director, Division of Enforcement); Implementation of the Wall Street Reform Act, Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 86 (2011) (Statement of Mary L.
Schapiro, Chairman).
157. Chair Mary Jo White, Chairman's Address at SEC Speaks 2015 (Feb. 20, 2015)
("In 2014, we brought the highest number of cases in the history of the Commission, 755."); Andrew
Ceresney, Director of the Division of Enforcement, Remarks to the American Bar Association's
Business Law Section Fall Meeting (Nov. 21, 2014) ("In total, we filed 755 actions last year-the most
ever filed in the history of the Commission."); Chairman Mary L. Schapiro, Speech by SEC Chairman:
Remarks at 2012 New England Securities Conference (Oct. 11, 2012) (noting that the SEC "brought a
record number of enforcement actions in fiscal year 2011"); Robert Khuzami, Director of Division of
Enforcement, Remarks Before the Consumer Federation of America's Financial Services Conference
(Dec. 1, 2011) ("In fiscal year 2011, the SEC filed a record 735 enforcement actions-a nearly 9 percent
increase over the previous year."); Stephen M. Cutler, Director of Division of Enforcement, Remarks
Before the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (Dec. 12, 2002) ("We filed a record
number of enforcement actions last year . . . ."); Stephen M. Cutler, Director of Division of
Enforcement, Remarks at the University of Michigan Law School (Nov. 1, 2002) ("We filed a record
number of enforcement actions-598, which is more than 100 cases above the previous fiscal year.");
Chairman Harvey L. Pitt, Remarks at the Commission Open Meeting (Oct. 16, 2002) ("We've brought a
record number of enforcement actions.").
158. SEC Commissioner Elisse B. Walter, Letter to the Editor, The SEC's Triumphs
Got Short Shrift, WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2011) ("[W]e filed a record number of enforcement actions last
year.").
159. Press Release, SEC's FY 2014 Enforcement Actions Span Securities Industry
and Include First-Ever Cases (Oct. 16, 2014) ("In the fiscal year that ended in September, the SEC filed
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This relentless promotion of the "record number of enforcement actions,"
year after year, suggests that generating this number is a bureaucratic
priority. Summary disposition is a part of how the agency meets this goal; it
allows the agency to bring and close cases without the consent of the
defendant-an easy and reliable way to boost the enforcement statistics.162
Unfortunately, the total number of enforcement actions is a very poor
metric for assessing the impact of SEC's enforcement program. A single
"enforcement action" might be the result of an SEC investigation, or a follow-
on action, piggybacking on the investigative work done by another agency. It
might target a number of respondents in a large securities conspiracy, or merely
be one of many "actions" arising out of the same event or course of conduct.163
a record 755 enforcement actions."); Press Release, SEC Announces Enforcement Results for FY 2013
(Dec. 17, 2013) ("The SEC filed 686 enforcement actions in the fiscal year that ended in September.");
Press Release, Enforcement Director Robert Khuzami to Leave SEC (Jan. 9, 2013) (announcing that
Khuzami led the agency to "the all-time record number of 735 SEC enforcement actions in FY 2011 and
another 734 actions in FY 2012"); Press Release, George S. Canellos Named Acting Director of
Enforcement (Jan. 31, 2013) ("As Deputy Director, he helped to oversee a division that brought record
numbers of enforcement actions . . . ." (quoting SEC Chairman Elisse B. Walter)); Press Release, SEC's
Enforcement Program Continues to Show Strong Results in Safeguarding Investors and Markets: Last
Two Years Reflect Two Highest Numbers of Total Actions Brought by SEC (Nov. 14, 2012) ("[Tlhe
Securities and Exchange Commission today announced that it filed 734 enforcement actions in the fiscal
year that ended Sept. 30, 2012, one shy of last year's record of 735."); Press Release, SEC Enforcement
Division Produces Record Results in Safeguarding Investors and Markets Agency's Fiscal Year Totals
Show Most Enforcement Actions Filed in Single Year (Nov. 9, 2011) ("The Securities and Exchange
Commission today announced that the agency filed a record 735 enforcement actions in the fiscal year
that ended September 30."); Press Release, SEC Announces Fiscal 2008 Enforcement Results Agency
Brings Second-Highest Number of Actions Ever; Significant Increase in Insider Trading and Market
Manipulation Cases (Oct. 22, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-254.htm ("The
Securities and Exchange Commission today announced that the second-highest number of enforcement
actions in agency history took place in fiscal year 2008."); see also The SEC-Revitalized, Reformed
and Protecting Investors, https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-240-accomplishments.htm
(praising the accomplishments of Mary L. Schapiro as chair, including that she "[a]chieved [r]ecord
[r]esults in [e]nforcement and [i]nspections" and "[b]rought a record number of enforcement actions-
including 735 enforcement actions in FY 2011").
160. E.g., Aruna Viswanatha & Tim Dobbyn, U.S. SEC Enforcement Cases Hit
Record High in 2011, REUTERS (Nov. 9. 2011); Rachelle Younglai, Unshackled, Wall Street's Cop Goes
Hard on Fraud, REUTERS (Aug. 14, 2009); Andrew Countryman, Securities Regulators Kept Busy
Enforcement Staff's Increase Contributed to Year's Record Number of Disciplinary Actions, CH.
TRIBUNE (Jan. 1, 2004).
161. For discussion of these and related arguments, see Velikonja, Politics in
Securities Enforcement, supra note 105, at 27-33.
162. See Marc J. Fagel, The State of SEC Enforcement Heading into 2015, 29
INSIGHTS: THE CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW ADVISOR NO. 2 (Feb. 2015) (suggesting that the
Division of Enforcement "clearly is enthusiastic" about the broad prosecution of "broken windows"
offenses since it allows them to "announce record-breaking case filings without the same resource
expenditures as individual investigations"); Tracey Samuelson, Why the SEC is all about "broken
windows, " MARKETPLACE (Sept. 11, 2014) (suggesting that the real purpose of these easy cases is to
"help the agency report higher numbers of successful actions" (quoting Michael Rivera, Chair of
Securities Enforcement at Venable LLP)). Ironically, the SEC's behavior is analogous to the behavior of
companies regulated by SEC, who have manipulated their earnings in order to meet or top previous
quarter earnings. See Francois Degeorge et al., Earnings Management to Exceed Thresholds, 72 J. Bus.
1 (1999); see also Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 782
(2006) (citing DeGeorge et al., supra).
163. Fagel, supra note 162 ("20 of the 755 actions were filed in a single day to stop




It might be a groundbreaking case establishing a new point of law or a routine
regulatory action. It might culminate in substantial penalties (like lifetime
164
collateral bars and civil penalties) or relatively unimportant ones.
The agency appears to be allocating scarce enforcement resources to the
pursuit of a questionable statistic. The agency and its legislative supervisors
seem to be looking "where the light is" to evaluate the agency's enforcement
program. Perhaps Congress does not understand the problems with the
enforcement number. Or perhaps Congress understands the problems, but also
knows that the public does not. Most disturbingly, perhaps the agency or
Congress is captured by the regulated industry and favors an appearance of
active enforcement (to placate voters and Congress) without actually robust
enforcement (to placate key players in the industry).'ss
Scholars have often criticized SEC enforcement for bringing a few
headline-grabbing cases designed to create a favorable (but inaccurate)
impression of its enforcement program.166 The emphasis on the number of
enforcement actions seems to be another version of the same phenomenon.1
67
The agency has defended its focus on quantity over quality as an
implementation of a quasi-"broken windows" theory of law enforcement.168
Under that model, "even the smallest infractions have victims, and that the
164. See id.; Joshua Gallu, SEC Boosts Tally of Enforcement Successes with Routine
Actions, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Feb. 22, 2013).
165. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices About Investor
Protection in the Face of Uncertainty, 84 WASH U. L. REv. 1591, 1600 (2006) ("[W]ell-publicized
regulatory action might provide a political buffer from more intrusive 'actual' regulation when scandal
or troubles provoke the public.").
166. Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker, supra note 165, at 1600 ("' [H]eavy' SEC
regulation is often more apparent than real, more dramaturgical than truly burdensome" and "the SEC
could be its own purveyor of the illusion that investor protection is of higher quality than it really is.");
Adam C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1083 (2005)
("[T]he political cycling between policies of benign neglect and hysterical overreaction suggests that
SEC far from serving as a shelter against the vagaries of the political winds, acts more like a
weathervane, swinging wildly with the change in the political atmosphere."); Robert A. Prentice, The
Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 776 (2006) (referring to the "familiar cycle"
where "[l]oose regulation allows for scandal, which then creates a political atmosphere supportive of
aggressive regulation, followed by backlash by those regulated"). Some scholars have proposed spinning
off the enforcement division as a way to reduce the SEC's accountability to Congress. Pritchard, supra,
at 1076; Peter J. Henning, Should the SEC Spin Off the Enforcement Division?, 11 TRANSACTIONS: THE
TENN. J. OF BUs. L. 121 (2009).
167. See, e.g., Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance, supra note 83;
Velikonja, Politics in Securities Enforcement, supra note 105, at 33-38; JONATHAN R. MACEY, THE
DEATH OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 270-71 (2013); see also LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, supra note
5, at 45 (describing criticism of SEC enforcement from "the business community" that focuses on
"pressure on the enforcement staff to 'make their numbers' by meeting or exceeding expectations about
how many cases they close").
168. In October 2013, newly appointed Chair Mary Jo White announced a new
enforcement program modeled after the famous "broken windows" theory of policing-i.e., the idea that
"when a broken window is not fixed, it 'is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows
costs nothing."' Chair Mary Jo White, Remarks at the Securities Enforcement Forum (Oct. 9, 2013)
(quoting James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, THE ATLANTIC (1982)); see also
Prentice, Inevitability, supra note 85, at 830 (suggesting that "stringent securities laws shape morals and
behavior").
475
Yale Journal on Regulation
smallest infractions are very often just the first step toward bigger ones down
the road,"1 69 and so the agency must "pursue all types of wrongdoing" and "not
overlook[] the small violations to avoid breeding an environment of
indifference to our rules." 70
But this approach is questionable. Even setting aside whether the "broken
windows" approach was actually successful in driving down street crime, it is
hardly obvious that the same approach would prove successful in combating
business crime.1 7 1
Professor Barkow has defended the "broken windows" approach at the
SEC,172 but her account does not specifically focus on the prosecution of low-
level infractions.173 She acknowledges that the "broken windows" approach
may give enforcers "too much unchecked discretion," but finds that the SEC is
adequately "checked" by the oversight that is "built in to the structure of the
administrative state,"174 as well as "by an organized, well-financed community
if it goes too far with new policing techniques."75
Unfortunately, summary disposition allows the agency deliberately to
avoid these procedural checks designed to limit its level of enforcement.176 And
by bringing a large number of relatively minor cases, targeting unrepresented
individuals, the agency steers well-clear of the "well-financed" community
Barkow describes.1 7 7
Whether it serves the public interest or not, the agency's pursuit of a large
number of low-level offenses appears to be driven, in part, by the availability of
administrative summary judgment. 178
169. Mary Jo White, Chairman, Remarks at the Securities Enforcement Forum (Oct. 9,
2013).
170. Id. Indeed, some have tied the rise in SEC delinquent filing prosecutions-one of
the main categories of summary disposition-to the "broken windows" strategy. E.g., Samuelson, supra
note 162 (quoting Professor John Coffee as saying that "[b]y forcing stricter disclosure, I think, in turn,
you're going to reduce the prospect of insiders exploiting material nonpublic information."); Thomas A.
Zaccaro & Ryan A. Walsh, Attempting to Fix the "Broken Windows": Recent SEC Enforcement Action
Targets Routine Disclosure Obligations of Public Corporations and their Insiders, PAUL HASTINGS
ALERT (Oct. 2014) ("[I]n policing mere disclosure violations, the SEC has taken yet another step to
further its professed 'broken windows' enforcement strategy."); see also Fagel, supra note 162
(suggesting that the Chair's "'broken windows' policy, filing suit to enforce even minor, rarely-enforced
provisions of the federal securities laws . . . helps explain the record number of cases brought last year").
171. See LANGVEOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK, supra note 5, at 45-46
(suggesting that it is "doubtful" whether the broken windows model is helpful in white collar crime, and
noting the risk of crowding out bigger, harder cases).
172. Rachel E. Barkow, The New Policing ofBusiness Crime, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
435 (2014).
173. She focuses on the shift towards a more "proactive" and "intelligence-led"
enforcement model. Id.
174. Id. at 465.
175. Id. at 467.
176. See infra Section I.C.
177. See Barkow, New Policing, supra note 172, at 467.
178. Scholars have previously commented on how the desire to deliver the "right"
number-i.e., one that is higher than last year's-has skewed SEC enforcement practice towards "low




1-3: Drifting agencies will use summary judgment to bring more minor
actions and target weaker defendants
The overwhelming majority of summary dispositions are granted in two
categories of cases: follow-ons and delinquent filings. These are low-impact
cases. While some scholars have noted that the SEC has been bringing more of
these types of actions recently,179 they have not yet connected this trend to the
procedural innovation of summary disposition. Without this novel procedural
device, this shift in enforcement would not have been possible. The availability
of the procedure has changed the mix of cases brought by the agency.
Almost half of summary dispositions granted for the agency involved at
least one respondent who was pro sel s-the kind of individual who might
benefit most from an in-person hearing, where the ALJ could ensure he has a
chance to make his best case. This is a significantly higher than normal rate of
unrepresented respondents: a recent study of SEC ALJ initial judgments from
2010 to 2015 found that respondents were unrepresented about a quarter of the
time. 81 The availability of the procedure seems to be causing the agency to
target different types of defendants than it would otherwise.
The more minor cases and minor offenders leave fewer resources for more
serious enforcement actions. As Commissioner Piwowar put it: "If every rule is
a priority, then no rule is a priority."1 82
The SEC has been repeatedly accused of systematically targeting weak
respondents in order to serve bureaucratic imperatives. One study found that
the SEC targeted more smaller companies (by market capitalization) than did
private plaintiffs-a finding the authors found to be "consistent with the
hypothesis that the SEC . . . prefer[s] weak opponents."1
83 Another found that
the SEC was more likely to seek industry bars against smaller firms and their
employees.184 And, when the SEC sought (and won) large monetary penalties
and Gov't Reform, 112th Cong. (2011) (Statement of Prof. Jonathan Macey); see also JONATHAN R.
MACEY, THE DEATH OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 270-71 (2013); LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, supra
note 5, at 45; Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation:
A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 949 (1994); Langevoort, The SEC as a
Lawmaker, supra note 165, at 1620.
179. E.g., Velikonja, Politics in Securities Enforcement, supra note 105, at 35-38.
180. See fig.9.
181. See Zaring, supra note 99, at 1179.
182. Commissioner Michael S. Piwowar, Remarks to the Securities Enforcement
Forum 2014 (Oct. 14, 2014); see also Commissioner Michael S. Piwowar, Remarks at "SEC Speaks"
Conference 2015: A Fair, Orderly, and Efficient SEC (Feb. 20, 2015) ("Did you hear that the SEC has
invented a new stove? It has fifty front burners.").
183. Cox & Thomas, supra note 51, at 764; see also id. at 777, 778. But see James D.
Cox et al., Public and Private Enforcement of the Securities Laws: Have things Changed Since Enron?,
80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893 (2005); cf Steinway, supra note 105, at 225 (reading the post-Enron shift
to bigger companies as a public relations strategy, rather than a genuinely public-interested one).
184. Gadinis, supra note 96, at 683, 685. There are some arguments that would give
justification and support to the SEC pursuing smaller companies. For instance, private securities
litigation may be more likely to pursue bigger companies-who are more likely to be willing to settle
cases quickly with big payouts to plaintiffs' lawyers-which means the SEC should focus on the smaller
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against issuers, many complained that these penalties were really borne by
the relatively vulnerable (and often innocent) shareholders, rather than the well-
funded managers and directors who were actually responsible, and accused the
SEC of seeking favorable headlines at the expense of public interest.186 One
study showed that SEC was less likely to bring enforcement actions against
companies with strong political connections through campaign contributions
and lobbying.187 Summary disposition appears to continue this trend.
Figure 9: Summary Dispositions for Division by Status of Respondent,
FY 1996-2014
I-4: Administrative prosecutors at drifting agencies will "play for the
rules" to develop broad summary judgment programs through case-by-case
adjudication, not rulemaking.
ones. Or perhaps the SEC has more faith that it can get the bigger companies to follow the law, and feels
the need to clear the misbehaving smaller fish from the industry.
185. The landmark is the Xerox case, in which the company paid a $10 million
penalty. See Xerox Corp., Litigation Release No. 17465, 77 SEC Docket 971 (Apr. 11, 2002); see also
Atkins & Bondi, supra note 147, at 394. Penalties against issuers have only grown since then. E.g.,
Steinway, supra note 105, at 210.
186. Atkins & Bondi, supra note 147, at 415-16 ("The SEC ... faces ... moral
hazards when contemplating the assessment of issuer penalties. Does the prospect of large issuer
penalties and the inevitable press coverage cause the SEC to misallocate resources to build these cases to
the detriment of other types of enforcement actions?"); Steinway, supra note 105 (discussing the
"possibility that the SEC will select targets not because they are the worst violators, but for improper
reasons such as agency or individual self aggrandizement").









At first glance, the history of the SEC's program appears not to bear these
indicia: the rule authorizing summary disposition was enacted in 1995 via
notice and comment rulemaking.
A closer look reveals the opposite. The regulatory history of the 1995 rule
reflects a concern with protecting respondents. After the "Remedies Act" of
1990 expanded the SEC's enforcement arsenal inside administrative
proceedings, the agency launched a task force to examine and overhaul the
rules of procedure to preserve the fairness of the forum.' In its review, the
Task Force found that the "apparent reason" for the existing prohibition on
dispositive motions prior to the hearing was "the principle that it is the
Commission's sole prerogative to determine what matters will be subject to
hearing," but if a hearing officer were to dismiss the case before the hearing, he
or she would be "overruling the Commission's determination that allegations
by the staff warrant a hearing." The Task Force found that this "principle" was
"no longer entirely valid" 89 and recommended liberalizing the availability of
dispositive motions for respondents.1 90
Things have not worked out that way. Statements made during a 2014
hearing by Chief Administrative Law Judge Brenda Murray reveal just how far
summary disposition practice has strayed from its administrative origins:
My belief is that when the Commission sets a case down for hearing, and
there has been no factual changes between when they made the decision to
set it down and when the motion for summary disposition has been filed,
that the agency does not want motions for summary disposition granted
because you're second-guessing their decision that the case needs to get
191
set down for hearing and that there is a legal basis for it.
188. TASK FORCE REPORT 1-2 (introduction by SEC Chairman Richard C. Breeden,
explaining that the Task Force was driven by the 1990 Remedies Act); see also Platt, supra note 4, at
32-35, 38-39 (contrasting this effort at procedural reform with the post-Dodd Frank inaction on this
front).
189. See TASK FORCE REPORT 174-75.
190. However, the proposed rule was framed to allow "any party" to make such a
motion, id. at 173, and the Commission adopted this language in its proposed rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 61,732,
61,745-46. A commentator objected to making the motions available to the Division and proposed make
the motion unilateral, but the Commission explained that "the circumstances when summary disposition
prior to hearing could be appropriately sought or granted will be comparatively rare" since "[t]ypically,
Commission proceedings that reach litigation involve basic disagreement as to material facts." 60 Fed.
Reg. 32,738, 32,768 (1995). "Motions for disposition prior to hearing may provide particular benefits in
regulatory proceedings. Enforcement or disciplinary proceedings in which a motion for disposition prior
to hearing would be appropriate are likely to be less common. Typically, enforcement and disciplinary
proceedings that reach litigation involve genuine disagreement between the parties as to material facts."
Id. at 32,767.
191. See In re Anthony et al., SEC File No. 3-15514, Prehearing Conference Tr.
30:13-21 (Jan. 21, 2014); see also Jean Eaglesham, Fairness of SEC Judges Is in Spotlight, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 22, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fairness-of-sec-judges-is-in-spotlight-1448236970
(quoting CALJ Murray in saying "[s]o for me to say I am wiping it out, it looks like I am saying to these
presidential appointee commissioners, I am reversing you. And they don't like that.").
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Chief Judge Murray's statement that a grant of summary disposition for a
respondent is inappropriately overruling the Commission runs directly contrary
to the 1993 Task Force Report and the 1995 Rules adopting the
recommendations of that report.192
Instead of announcing a revision of summary disposition rules explicitly
through rulemaking, the Division relied on key favorable rulings from ALJs
and the Commission to approve its creative and aggressive use of the new
motion.
The development of the doctrine surrounding the use of summary
disposition in follow-ons reveals how administrative prosecutors are able to
drive the development of broad administrative summary judgment programs
through case-by-case adjudication.
Follow-on cases involve a respondent who has already been found liable
for a securities violation in some other forum. The SEC then brings an action to
impose a separate penalty. These may be severe, including monetary finesl93
and lifetime bars from the industry.1 94 In exercising their discretion to choose
an appropriate punishment, ALJs are required to weigh various factors
including "the sincerity of the defendant's assurances against future violations,"
"the degree of scienter involved," and "the defendant's recognition of the
wrongful nature of his conduct," and "the likelihood of future violations."l95
These factors seem to be exactly the kind of issues that an in-person
hearing would be helpful to elucidate. They require credibility assessments and
investigation into facts beyond those required to establish the underlying
violation. Indeed, the progenitors of the Consensus Justification for
administrative summary judgment, Gellhorn and Robinson, embraced a
restriction on summary judgment in cases where "motive and intent play
leading roles" or which "involve[d] a question of witness credibility."1 96 And,
several of the leading cases (outside of the SEC) limited approval of
administrative summary judgment to issues "precisely" defined, finding it
inappropriate for those that "call for the exercise of discretion or subjective
judgment." 97At least under current doctrine,198 these follow-on cases seem to
be poor candidates for resolution on the papers.199
192. The SEC's recently enacted reforms to the rules of practice appear to override
Judge Murray's conclusions by providing that a respondent may move for judgment on the pleadings as
of right, in order to challenge the underlying legal theories. See SEC Amendments to the Commission s
Rules ofPractice, 17 C.F.R. pt. 201 at 52, 112-13 (2016) (adopting new Rule 250(a)).
193. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1(g)(1)(B), 78u-2(a)(1), 80a-9(d)(1), 80b-3(i)(1).
194. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(6)(A), 78o-4(c)(4), 78q-l(c)(4)(C), 80b-3(f).
195. Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1140 (5th Cir. 1979) aff'd on other grounds,
450 U.S. 91 (1981); see also Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. SEC, 837 F.2d 1099, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(rejecting the imposition of a penalty where the agency did not have "before it the full record germane to
determining whether [relevant] factors . . . were present").
196. Gellhom & Robinson, supra note 2, at 614 n.9, 618.
197. Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 622 n.17 (1973);
Citizens for Allegan Cty., Inc. v. FPC, 414 F.2d 1125, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (suggesting that




Nevertheless, a few years after the summary disposition rule was created
in 1995, SEC prosecutors began seeking summary disposition in follow-on
actions. The Commission confronted the question for the first time in 2002.
Respondent John Brownson had already pleaded guilty to criminal securities
fraud charges when the Enforcement Division commenced an AP, based on the
same conduct leading to his guilty plea, seeking to bar him from associating
with any broker or dealer. The Division moved for summary disposition, and
the ALJ granted the motion. Brownson appealed to the Commission, claiming
he was entitled to present his evidence regarding the various penalty factors in
a live, oral hearing. The Commission sided with its prosecutors. It conceded
that "[s]ummary disposition may not be appropriate in every case," since some
follow-on respondents "may present genuine issues with respect to facts that
could mitigate his or her misconduct" pursuant to the public interest factors, but
held that Brownson (who was a pro se respondent) had "wholly fail[ed] to
specify" what evidence he expected to present "or explain how it would
establish circumstances, such as rehabilitation or mitigating factors that would
counter a determination that it is in the public interest to bar him." 2
00
This was hardly a blanket approval. Nevertheless, SEC prosecutors ran
with it, and (with ALJ acquiescence) began systematically dispensing with
hearings in follow-on actions.201 And, in a 2007 decision, when the
Commission considered the issue again, it established a full-blown presumption
in favor of summary disposition for follow-on proceedings.202 The Division
responded accordingly.203
leading roles"); see also Turner, supra note 19, at 732-33 ("Disputes relating solely to historical facts or
credibility of testimony generally require a trial to allow confrontation and cross-examination.").
198. Some have proposed that these penalties should be automatic. See, e.g.,
Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance, supra note 83, at 963. But, under current law, they are not.
Id.
199. Cf Matthews, supra note 46, at 259-60 ("Since the Commission must tailor its
sanction to comply with public interest criteria, character witness testimony can constitute a crucial
underpinning of a respondent's trial strategy. In this respect, trial of the administrative proceeding
resembles criminal litigation much more than routine civil litigation."). When scholars describe follow-
ons as "strict liability" offenses, this is actually misleading: the determination of liability is on the basis
of strict liability, but the penalty is not.
200. In re John S. Brownson, SEC Release No. 46161, at I1-12 (Commission, July 3,
2002).
201. For instance, in a 2003 case, a respondent opposed the Division of Enforcement's
motion for summary disposition in a follow-on proceeding, seeking an opportunity for a hearing on
Steadman factors "such as the egregiousness of his conduct and his scienter," but the ALJ granted
summary disposition (citing Brownson) and held that the respondent had an adequate opportunity to
present his evidence regarding these factors in his pleadings, which (pursuant to the rule) would be
"taken as true." In re Callipari, Admin Proceeding No. 3-11205, Release No. 237 (Initial Decision, Sept.
30, 2003).
202. In the Matter of Conrad P. Seghers, Admin. Proceeding No. 3-12433, Release
No. 2656 (Commission, Sept. 26, 2007) ("For a follow-on proceeding, summary disposition may be
inappropriate in certain rare circumstances when a respondent may present genuine issues with respect
to facts that could mitigate his or her misconduct.").
203. See fig.10.
481
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 34, 2017
Figure 10: Summary Dispositions in Follow-On Proceedings, FY 1996-2014
FY
The SEC's prosecutors obtained favorable interpretations of the agency's
procedural rules that it then magnified and used to its advantage. Perhaps these
prosecutors benefited from their repeat player effect, and their ability to "play
for the rules."204 Or, perhaps they benefitted from AU bias.205 Either way, the
extremely liberal rules now governing the Division's use of summary
disposition feeds into the suspicion that administrative proceedings are
fundamentally "rigged" against respondents, and the SEC has a "home court
204. See supra note 37.
205. There is some evidence that SEC's ALJs feel pressure to rule for the agency. In
May 2015, the Wall Street Journal published a report based on an interview of a former SEC ALJ
(Lillian McEwan) who claimed that, while on the bench, Chief ALJ Brenda Murray criticized her for
ruling against the agency, questioned her "loyalty to the SEC," and pressured her to rule in favor of the
agency more often. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins with In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015)
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803. Ms. McEwan explained that,
while an ALJ, she felt that she was "expected to work on the assumption that 'the burden was on the
people who were accused to show that they didn't do what the agency said they did."' Id. This report led
one group of respondents to seek discovery regarding the possible bias of the ALJ hearing their case,
Cameron Elliot. The Commission responded with an order "inviting" the ALJ in question to file an
affidavit "addressing whether he has had any communications or experienced any pressure similar to
that alleged in the ... Wall Street Journal article .. . and whether he is aware of any specific instances in
which any other Commission ALJ has had such communications or experienced such pressure. Order
Concerning Additional Submission and Protective Order, In Re Timbervest, Admin. Proceeding No. 3-
15519, IAA Release No. 4103, ICA Release No. 31660 (June 4, 2015); see also Jean Eaglesham, SEC
Judge Declines To Submit Affidavit of No Bias, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2015),
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/06/1 1/sec-judge-declines-to-submit-affidavit-of-no-bias (quoting
professor Kent Barnett as describing the request as "unprecedented" and "bizarre"). Judge Elliott
declined to file the affidavit without comment. Eaglesham, SEC Judge, supra. The SEC's Inspector
General cleared Judge Murray of any impropriety. See SEC Office of Inspector General, Report of















advantage"206-suspicions which have fueled a backlash against the agency,
207
culminating in several pending legal challenges.
The SEC's use of Summary Disposition appears to bear the hallmarks of
"drift." Whereas the Consensus Justification imagines the agency's prosecutors
making individualized case-by-case determinations about which hearings
would be "futile," the procedure seems to have impacted the agency's
enforcement program in a much broader way. It has facilitated a shift towards
easy-to-prosecute offenses, against less-well-represented targets, in order to
pursue questionable statistical goals set by Congress. At the same time as it has
shaped their enforcement priorities, SEC prosecutors appear to have
aggressively sought and attained broader and broader definitions of the
administrative summary judgment rule.
IV. Implications
The Unstacking the Deck theory raises questions and issues about
administrative summary judgment that the Consensus Justification cannot
address. This part surveys implications for scholars, courts, ALJs, Congress,
agencies, and the SEC.
A. Scholars
Agency decisions about enforcement priorities constitute an important
208
part of the regulatory landscape. Yet as compared to rulemaking or
adjudication, these programmatic enforcement decisions have remained
relatively insulated, not only from judicial review,209 but also from academic
study.2 10
206. See generally sources cited supra note 100. Concerns about SEC neutrality have
been raised in the past. See ABA Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., Report of Task Force on the SEC
Administrative Law Judge Process, 47 Bus. LAW.1731, 1734 (1992).
207. The agency has recently attempted to quietly confirm its authority to bring
summary disposition in follow-on cases by referring, in passing, to this authority in recently
promulgated amendments to its rules of practice. See supra note 136.
208. See supra note 33.
209. See, e.g., Andrias, supra note 33, at 1043; Barkow, Overseeing Agency
Enforcement, supra note 32,,at 102 ("Most aspects of agency enforcement policy generally escape
judicial review . . . . Courts tend to steer clear of second-guessing an agency's selection of which actors
to target and which to ignore."); Lemos, supra note 32, at 45 ("Nor will courts second-guess the
government's decisions to enforce or not to enforce.").
210. Andrias, supra note 33, at 1033-34 ("[Scholars have . . . undertaken remarkably
little analysis of the President's role in agency enforcement."); Barkow, Overseeing Agency
Enforcement, supra note 32, at 103-04 (noting that administrative enforcement policy has received
"insufficient attention"); Lemos, supra note 32, at 13 (noting that administrative enforcement remains
"remarkably under-theorized"); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67
VAND. L. REV. 671, 678 (2014) ("[U]ntil recently the ... issue of policy-based nonenforcement attracted
only a few relatively brief and impressionistic treatments.").
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This is changing.211 In recent years, scholars have explored many different
aspects administrative enforcement policy, including presidential control,212 the
distinct issues presented by decisions not to enforce,213 and the roles of
institutional design,214 management and training strategies,2 15  financial
incentives,216 and agency reporting statutes217 in shaping enforcement priorities.
Scholars have also explored various philosophical and theoretical foundations
for enforcement.218 Finally, scholars have evaluated various proposals such as
subjecting enforcement decisions to cost/benefit analysis,219 OIRA-style
centralized review,220 a sentencing commission,221 insulating enforcement
decisions from judicial review using the political question doctrine,222 and
taking all enforcement authority away from specialized agencies and
reassigning it to generalist enforcers.223
However, this growing literature of administrative enforcement has
overlooked a critical input into enforcement decision making: administrative
adjudication procedure. This Article has shown that adjudication procedure can
drive enforcement priorities, and can serve as a site for competing political
agendas between the enacting Congress, the agency, the regulated industry, and
the current Congress. Moreover, as elaborated in the next section, procedure
and procedural developments can serve as an indirect avenue for judicial
211. See Max Minzer, Should Agencies Enforce?, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2069, 2074
(2015) ("How administrative agency enforcement should be structured is beginning to receive
considerable academic attention.").
212. See, e.g., Andrias, supra note 33.
213. Zachary S. Price, Reliance on Nonenforcement, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017); Zachary S. Price, Politics of Nonenforcement, 65 CASE W. L. REv. 1119 (2015);
Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, supra note 210.
214. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, supra note 32; Rachel E. Barkow,
Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010); Rachel
E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61
STAN. L. REV. 869, 871 (2009).
215. Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 959 (2009).
216. E.g., Margaret H. Lemos & Max Mnizner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127
HARV. L. REV. 853 (2014); Christopher C. DeMuth Sr. & Michael S. Greve, Agency Finance in the Age
ofExecutive Government, George Mason U. L. & Econ. Research Paper Series 16-25 (2016).
217. Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance, supra note 83.
218. See Lemos, supra note 32; Max Minzner, Why Agencies Punish, 53 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 853 (2012); Margaret H. Lemos & Alex Stein, Strategic Enforcement, 95 MINN. L. REV.
9 (2011).
219. J.W. Verret, Economic Analysis in Securities Enforcement: The Next Frontier at
the SEC, 82 U. CINCINNATI L. REV. 49 (2013).
220. Andrias, supra note 33, at 1077-1107.
221. Max Minzner, A Sentencing Commission for the Administrative State?, 103 GEO.
L. J. ONLINE 87 (2015).
222. Zachary S. Price, Law Enforcement as Political Question, 91 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1572 (2016).
223. Minzner, Should Agencies Enforce?, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2069 (2015); see also
Adam C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70, supra note 166 (evaluating whether the SEC should spin off the




review into agency enforcement priorities. As scholars continue to study
administrative enforcement, they should not overlook the role of procedure.
B. Courts
Deck-stacking theorists have struggled to provide a satisfactory account of
the role of courts in setting administrative procedures. Early articulations
assumed courts would act as "faithful agents" to the original legislative
coalition;224 deck-stacking procedures could only achieve their political ends if
agencies actually adhered to them, and it was left to courts to ensure they did
so.
The notion that courts ought to respect the decision of the enacting
Congress (as crystalized in statutory text) over and above conflicting positions
of a subset of the contemporary Congress or administrative agency, is now a
broadly accepted principle in the lawyerly world.225 But, as a descriptive
matter, courts plainly do not always do this-they do not always act as faithful
agents to the enacting Congress, and instead often interpret substantive and
procedural statutes in ways that would have been unimaginable to their
drafters.226 As a matter of theory (if not doctrine), departing from the enacting
Congress's views may or may not be the right thing to do.227
Theorists quickly proposed alternatives to the faithful agent model for
courts. Some argued that courts enforced procedural devices as written in order
to avoid legislative reprisal.228 But then scholars showed that the fear of reprisal
is not realistic.229 Moreover, if true, it would undermine the entire positive
theory of administrative procedure: courts would choose procedures to satisfy
current legislative majorities, not the enacting ones.
Professor Jonathan Macey has proposed that courts designed civil
procedure to give themselves the ability to resolve cases outside their areas of
224. E.g., Bressman, supra note 25, at 1772 ("Positive political theorists have not
looked across the whole spectrum of administrative law .... At most, they have assumed that the Court
would produce principles to assist Congress in monitoring agencies." (emphasis added)).
225. See Jane S. Schacter, Text or Consequences?, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1007, 1008 &
n.7 (2011) (observing that it has become common for scholars to proclaim that "we are all textualists
now" and collecting sources).
226. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994);
Bressman, supra note 25.
227. The literature on the theoretical justifications and drawbacks of competing modes
of statutory interpretation is vast. For one starting place, compare ESKRIDGE, supra note 226, with
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Guttmann
ed., 1997). For one overview, see Abbe Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1761-70 (2010).
228. See McNollgast, Conditions for Judicial Independence, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 105, 114-15 (2006) (suggesting that courts will formulate doctrines to minimize the possibility of
legislative reversal); see also Bressman, supra note 25, at nn. 137-38 (collecting sources).
229. See Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of
Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 28, 42 (1997).
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substantive expertise on technical procedural grounds.230 But this explanation
does not offer much help in the context of administrative adjudicatory
procedure-authorizing summary judgment for the ALJ inside the agency does
not significantly change the dynamics of review for the circuit court.
More generally, political scientists explain judicial behavior through some
function of, inter alia, ideology and leisure-preference.231 But ideology seems
an unlikely explanation for administrative procedural decisions: whatever
procedural rule is applied in a given case is likely to carry over to many others
in diverse contexts. And, allowing administrative summary judgment saves
significant time for the agency, but not much for the appellate court, which still
must review the decision. In fact, by allowing the agency to bring and litigate
more cases, it means more cases will be appealed to courts for review.
Professor Lisa Bressman argues that courts' overarching interest in
construing the APA is not in acting as a faithful agent to Congress, but rather in
preserving their role as "mediator" between both political branches.232 This
leads the courts to make decisions based on a tradeoff between two competing
considerations: "the need for legislative monitoring" and the "concern for
judicial overreaching."233 On one side of the equation are the informational and
other interests identified by deck-stacking theorists. On the other side, the fear
of generating a new principal-agent problem for Congress to worry about.
Though she does not frame it in these terms, Bressman's theory seems to
be a hybrid between the Consensus and the Unstacking approaches. Consider
Bressman's application of her "mediation" theory to two key cases cutting back
(or declining to extend) procedural obligations in the rulemaking context:
Vermont Yankee and Florida East Coast Railway. In both cases, Bressman
argues, the Court declined to require additional layers of procedures because
the existing ones provided a sufficient measure of political control and
requiring additional ones might have appeared to be a "judicial overreach."234
The Court made a determination that, on the one hand, the political control
served by those procedures was adequately served by other procedures, and on
the other hand, going farther would risk diminishing the judiciary's role as
"mediator."
But in upholding summary judgment, courts have demonstrated no
awareness of the political control side of Bressman's equation-i.e., the
235programmatic or political dynamics of their decisions2. They have not
demonstrated any recognition that agencies might use summary judgment to
230. Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of
Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL. STUD. 627, 630 (1994).
231. E.g., LEE EPSTEIN, RICHARD POSNER & WILLIAM LANDES, THE BEHAVIOR OF
FEDERAL JUDGES (2012).
232. Bressman, supra note 25, at 1774.
233. Id. at 1775.
234. Id. at 1784-85.




shift enforcement priorities, or that they will do so in a manner that constitutes
"drift" away from enforcement choices made by the original enacting
Congress. Thus, if they are truly "mediating," they are doing a very one-sided
job of it.
At bottom, therefore, broad judicial approval of administrative summary
judgment appears to be, at least in part, an artifact of courts' lack of attention to
the downstream effects of procedural rulings on the agency's enforcement
programs. Before courts approve an individual deployment of summary
disposition inside a regime of formal APA adjudication, they should consider
questions posed by the Unstacking the Deck theory. When Congress imposed
this adjudication structure, did it evince an intent to make enforcement
expensive and thereby limit or channel the agency's enforcement program?
Will approving this procedure lead the agency to change its enforcement
priorities towards certain categories of cases or defendants, and away from
others? If the procedure is approved in some limited categories of cases, will
agency prosecutors respect those boundaries, or will they be likely to push to
expand them over time? To date, scholars have overlooked the programmatic
effects of administrative summary judgment, or the way it intersects with the
enacting Congress's intent for the agency's enforcement program. This
academic shortfall has left litigants and courts without an adequate basis for
conducting Bressmanian mediation.
C. ALJs
For some targets of administrative summary judgment, taking an appeal
up to the reviewing appellate court is simply too costly, and too slow. For these
defendants, making the procedural case against administrative summary
judgment before an ALJ will be their first and only chance. However, ALJs do
not have free reign to reconsider legal issues like the legality of administrative
summary judgment. At the SEC, for instance, ALJs are bound to follow the
precedents of Commission opinions-including those approving of broad
summary judgment practice. That is not to say that ALJs are powerless in
monitoring these procedural developments. For example, an ALJ who is
sympathetic to the arguments laid out in this paper against summary judgment
could acknowledge the precedent binding them, but issue an opinion calling it
into question, and certify the issue for interlocutory appeal to the commission
or other reviewing body.
D. Congress
The Unstacking the Deck lens shows that Congress plays an important
role in limiting or channeling agency enforcement priorities by designing
administrative procedure. But Congress can also incentivize drift. As discussed
above, the SEC's quantity-over-quality based enforcement approach seems to
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be driven by a desire to annually demonstrate "record" enforcement numbers-
something Congress apparently values.
If Congress believes that his quantitative approach is truly consistent with
the public interest, it should consider amending the appropriate statutes to
authorize summary judgment. It could amend APA § 556(d) to strike the
specific exception for "licensing" and "benefits" cases, and provide for a
general exception to the hearing requirements for any case where there is no
genuine issue of material fact. More narrowly, it could amend the specific
organic statutes for each particular agency to provide for summary judgment in
some or all cases.
But if Congress has doubts about this approach, it ought to stop
incentivizing agencies to skew their enforcement priorities simply to generate
potentially meaningless data. It should adjust its policies regarding what data
agencies are required to present-and should actively discourage agencies from
even presenting enforcement data that are not meaningfully linked to
enforcement effectiveness.236
E. Agencies
The availability of administrative summary judgment has the potential to
skew agency enforcement priorities towards those cases that happen to be most
amenable to this procedure-even if they are not the best use of the agency's
resources. This means bringing more, simpler cases against less well-funded
defendants, and foregoing the more difficult, and possibly more important,
cases.
Executive branch leaders have a duty to ensure that enforcement priorities
are chosen based on the public interest, and to resist changes in enforcement
priorities that are driven by factors other than the public interest.237 If the
changes in priorities that are driven by the availability of summary judgment
are not in the public interest, agencies should resist these changes.
Agencies should consider producing guidelines that lay out in detail when
and how they will seek summary judgment. These guidelines themselves would
likely not be directly subject to judicial review, but their existence would
facilitate judicial review of enforcement programs by giving an individual the
power to draw the court's attention to programmatic issues inside an individual
challenge to a case resolved on summary judgment.238
236. See Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance, supra note 83, at 970-77
(proposing specific reforms to the legislative reporting mandates).
237. See Lemos, supra note 32, at 20 ("Whereas private enforcers focus on private
costs and benefits, public enforcers can take account of the broader social consequences of the case,
including costs and benefits to defendants, third parties, and the system as a whole.").
238. For related proposals that agencies should bolster transparency of their
enforcement priorities, see Lemos, supra note 32, at 48-53 ("[E]nforcement policy ought to be





Thanks to the aggressive creativity of SEC prosecutors, and the
acquiescence of ALJs, the SEC now systematically applies summary judgment
in cases where it seems to be inappropriate even under the Consensus
Justification. In follow-on cases, the agency is now presumptively entitled to
summary disposition not only as to liability (which cannot reasonably be
contested), but also as to the penalty, which is supposed to be based on a
holistic evaluation of various factors including several related to the mental
state of the accused. 239 These factors are poorly suited for resolution on the
240
papers, as even the progenitors of the Consensus Justification recognized.
The SEC should consider implementing a hybrid procedure for follow-on
actions; utilizing summary disposition for liability, while allowing a hearing as
to the penalty. It could promulgate informal guidance outlining this procedure
for follow-on cases, which is likely available already under the rules which
allow for parties to seek partial summary disposition.241 Scholars could help
push the agency in this direction if they can demonstrate that the penalties
doled out in cases resolved on summary disposition were systematically more
severe than those where the respondent was allowed to appear in person before
the ALJ. (Such proof would be likely difficult to provide with any degree of
precision because of selection effects.)
Given the SEC's commitment to the view that an in-person hearing would
not make a difference as to penalty in follow-on cases, it should be willing to
facilitate an effective test of this proposition. The agency should conduct an
experiment: where the penalty phases of follow-on cases that the agency would
have assigned to summary disposition would be randomly assigned either to
summary disposition or to an in-person hearing. (A respondent randomly
assigned to summary disposition would have nothing to complain about from
the experiment since he would have been assigned to summary disposition
anyway.) Evidence that in-person hearings have no effect on penalty would
support the SEC's current position; evidence to the contrary would require it to
reevaluate its policy on summary disposition.
Conclusion
Administrative Summary Judgment rests on an incomplete theoretical
foundation. Scholars, agencies, and courts have concluded that costly statutory
hearings can be justifiably dispensed with where they would nec enhance
accuracy. But administrative procedure is not merely an instruti ent to be
Andrias, supra note 33, at 1078 ("[E]nforcement policy should involve a greater measure of
transparency-not of deliberation, but of the ultimate decisions made.").
239. See supra Section III.C.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 195-199.
241. 17 C.F.R. §201.250 (2016).
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expertly calibrated by agency prosecutors in individual cases; it is a mechanism
of congressional control over the bureaucracy. When the SEC uses summary
disposition to transform its enforcement priorities, it is breaking free of
procedural controls imposed by the enacting Congress-for better or for worse.
Many enforcement agencies employ some version of administrative summary
judgment.242 Additional work is needed to determine whether these other
agencies reflect the same issues as the SEC's use of the procedure.
For members of a regulated industry, an agency's enforcement priorities
are critically important-particularly where the underlying potentially
enforceable legal obligations are vast, complex, and/or vague. These priorities
are similarly important for investors, consumers, or other intended beneficiaries
of administrative enforcement programs. The effectiveness of the regulatory
program depends on effective enforcement, and the effectiveness of
enforcement depends on choosing the right set of actions to bring.243 As
scholars continue to explore various aspects of administrative enforcement,
they should not overlook the role that administrative procedure plays in shaping
enforcement priorities, both as a vehicle for congressional control and a site for
administrative rebellion.
242. E.g., 10 C.F.R. § 2.749 (NRC); 16 C.F.R. § 3.24 (FTC); 21 C.F.R. § 12.93
(FDA); 47 C.F.R. § 1.251 (FCC); 40 C.F.R. §§ 22.20, 124.75, 164.91 (EPA); 29 C.F.R. 102.35(h)
(NLRB); 29 C.F.R. § 2200.2 (OSHA). I explore these other agencies' summary judgment practices in a
separate paper.
243. See, e.g., Minzner, Should Agencies Enforce?, supra note 223 (arguing that
enforcement expertise is a distinct form of expertise, separate from an agency's expertise in its subject
area).
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